PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



some particulars. In the same manner, 

 where the circumstances of one event 

 tire, in some respects, the same with the 

 circumstances of another, which had be- 

 fore fallen under our notice, so far there 

 is a recurrence of the same impressions, 

 and that by the more general law 

 of association rccals the remaining- cir- 

 cumstances. This cause of connection 

 among- our ideas, like that of contiguity 

 in time or place, is of the greatest impor- 

 portancc, and at the same time liable to 

 be greatly misused. Without it the expe- 

 rience of the past would be of no utility 

 to us, for the same set of circumstances 

 never occurs twice ; if there be sufficient 

 similarity to recal the past, it now answers 

 the purpose of exciting the expectations 

 of what occurred in similar circumstances, 

 that is, of bringing the experience of the 

 past to bear upon the present. But as 

 similarity is only partial sameness, if it 

 be not accompanied with some discrimi- 

 nation, consequences will be expected 

 that will never happen, and conclusions, 

 which will mislead, will be formed with- 

 out any just foundation. Ideas are con- 

 nected together not only in consequence 

 of similarity, that is, sameness in some of 

 their component parts, but frequently 

 also from similarity in the sounds express- 

 ing them. It is upon this circumstance 

 that the art of punning is founded ; an 

 art which may be innocent in itself con- 

 sidered, but which, when made an ob- 

 ject of the mind, leads from sense to 

 sound, and prevents us from carefully ex- 

 amining the arguments and differences of 

 things, on which alone reasoning can be 

 founded. So much, indeed, is a habit of 

 punning at variance with habits of thought 

 and sober reflection, that the whole cur- 

 rent of thought will sometimes be divert- 

 ed from its proper channel, by some word 

 in which the thought is expressed, re- 

 calling, by similarity of sound, some other 

 vhich calls up its own train of thought. 

 A good pun may sometimes be consider- 

 ed as an exercise of the judgment ; but 

 more usually it is merely an exercise of 

 the associative power; in this particular 

 principle of connection, similarity in 

 sound ; and therefore it would be wise 

 in young persons to check the desire to 

 obtain an acquisition which is of little 

 value, because almost every one may ac- 

 quire it, and which must check the cul- 

 ture of other more valuable principles of 

 association. 



51. Another fertile principle of connec- 

 tion is contrariety, which connects to. 

 gether ideas which are totally, or in many 



respects opposite to each other. This, 

 however, is more the result of attention 

 and habit than those of contiguity in time 

 or place, and similarity. Some persons 

 are particularly disposed to it, others 

 have little tendency to it. It frequently 

 appears to arise from the natural tenden- 

 cy of the mind to change from one set of 

 feelings, which are in some way or other 

 displeasing, to others which may be 

 pleasing; and very often serves to il- 

 lustrate reasoning ; but particularly to 

 give interest and force to a description 

 of natural scenery, or a delineation of 

 character. 



52. The other principles of connection 

 which we mentioned are more refined, 

 and are the result of culture. A person 

 who has been more accustomed to philo- 

 sophize, or to reason, than to follow the 

 airy flights of wit or poetic fancy, con- 

 nects his ideas by the principles of cause 

 and effect, of means and end, of premises 

 and conclusion. When a phenomenon is 

 stated to his mind, it almost involuntarily 

 brings, forward ideas which serve to ac- 

 count for the phenomenon : we do not 

 mean, that the mind invariably brings 

 forward the right ideas, but simply those 

 which answer the wants of the individu- 

 al, by serving to account to him for the 

 phenomenon. So, in the same manner, 

 when an end is proposed, the train of 

 thought is concerned about the means, 

 which are often suggested, though the 

 object itself was never before in the view 

 of the mind. All these relations doubt- 

 less produce their effect by minute and 

 almost imperceptible samenesses in the 

 particular object now in the view of the 

 mind, and some one which before has 

 been, and has been connected by some 

 cause or other with the cause or means by 

 which it was produced, or to be produced ; 

 but it is convenient to speak of them as 

 distinct from the more obvious relations, 

 because they imply different culture of 

 the mind, and lead to such widely differ- 

 ent effects. Now any one of these con- 

 necting principles may, by habit, be 

 strengthened to such a degree as to give 

 us a command over all the different ideas 

 in our mind which have the given rela- 

 tion to each other; so that when any 

 one in the class occurs to us, we have 

 almost a certainty that it will suggest 

 the rest. As this appears to be an in- 

 disputable fact respecting the influence 

 of association, we may state it in the fol- 

 lowing general form : When an idea is 

 presented to the mind, either by sensa- 

 tion or by association, bearing certain 



