PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



the memory of adults, and of proficients 

 in any science, ought to be much more 

 ready and certain than that of children 

 and novices, as it is found to be in tact. 



62. As many words have complex ideas 

 annexed to them, so sentences, which are 

 collections of words, have collections of 

 complex ideas, that is, have decomplex 

 ideas. And it happens in most cases, that 

 the decomplex idea belonging to any sen- 

 tence, is not compounded merely to the 

 complex ideas belonging to the words of 

 it ; but that there are also many variations, 

 some oppositions, and numberless addi- 

 tions. Thus propositions, in particular, 

 excite, as soon as heard, assent or dissent; 

 which assent or dissent consist chiefly of 

 additional complex ideas not included in 

 the terms of the proposition. And it would 

 be of the greatest use both in the sciences 

 and in common life, thoroughly to analyse 

 this matter, to show in what manner, and 

 by what steps, that is, by what impressions 

 and associations our assent and dissent, 

 both in scienlifical and moral subjects, is 

 formed. 



Respecting' the Vividness of complex Ideas, 

 and tJie intellectual Pleasures and Pains 

 in general. 



63. It is reasonable to think, that some 

 ideas may be as vivid as any sensation ex- 

 cited by the direct action of objects upon 

 the external organs of sense. For com- 

 plex ideas may consist of so many parts, 

 and these may so alter and exalt one an- 

 other, that the sensorial change (whatever 

 that be), may be as great as can be pro- 

 duced by any single external impression. 

 And we know, as a matter of fact, that men- 

 tal pains are sometimes so acute as to coun- 

 terbalance, and even altogether remove, 

 the attention from the most excruciating 

 puin, which is merely that of sensation. This 

 process may be assisted and accelerated 

 by the mixture of vivid sensations among 

 the ideas, by the sensibility of the mental 

 frame, by a predisposition to a particular 

 class of ideas, &c. It is on this principle, 

 in connection with the preceding state- 

 ment, that we are enabled to account for 

 the existence of intellectual or mental 

 pleasures and pains (that is, those in which 

 no particular sensible pleasure or pain is 

 perceptible), which form a distinct and a 

 most important class of feelings. The 

 quality of sensible pleasures or pains, that 

 is, of pleasurable or painful sensations, 

 unite and coalesce in the same manner as 

 other ideas ; and variously connected and 

 blended together, they constitute the 



whole of those internal feelings which we 

 call passions, affections, emotions, &c, 

 In almost every step of our investigations 

 in mental philosophy, we are perplexed 

 by the scantiness of language, and still 

 more by the want of precision with which, 

 the words we have are employed. It is 

 much more easy to point out faults than 

 to correct them ; but it appears to us like- 

 ly to promote the object in one depart- 

 ment, if the two classes of ideas (the re- 

 licts of sensations), viz. those which are 

 pleasureable or painful, and those which 

 are indifferent, or, more properly, which 

 belong to the understanding, were deno- 

 minated, the latter notions, the former 

 feelings. Popular language would, in a 

 great measure, have borne us out in this 

 appropriation ; but, at least in the com- 

 mencement of our statements, we were 

 obliged to employ feelings in a more ge- 

 neral sense, viz. for every sensorial change 

 attended with consciousness, because we 

 have no other word in the language com- 

 prehending- ideas and sensations : hence- 

 fbrwards, however, we wish to appropriate 

 the word feelings to those complex ideas 

 which are either pleasureable or painful, 

 so as to correspond with Hartley's deno- 

 mination " intellectual or mental pleasures 

 and pains," including, as he appears to 

 do, the affections and pa&sions. 



64. It appears from the preceding sec- 

 tion, that the mental pleasures and pains 

 may be equal to, or greater or less than, 

 the sensible ones, according as each per- 

 son unites more or fewer, more vivid or 

 more languid ideas in the formation of 

 the mental pleasures and pains. 



65. It is of the utmost consequence to 

 morality and religion, that the feelings 

 should be analyzed into their simple com- 

 ponent parts, by reversing the steps of 

 the associations which concur to form 

 them. For thus we may learn how to 

 cherish and improve g'ood ones, to check 

 and root out such as ure mischievous and 

 immoral, and how to suit our manner of 

 life, in some tolerable measure, to our in- 

 tellectual and religious wants. And as 

 this holds, in respect of persons of all 

 ages, so it is particularly true and worthy 

 of consideration in respect of children 

 and youth. The world is, indeed, suffi- 

 ciently stocked with general precepts for 

 this purpose, grounded on experience ; 

 and whosoever will follow these faithful- 

 ly may expect w>d general success. 

 However, the doctrine of association, 

 whe,n traced up to the first rudiments of 

 understanding and affection, unfolds such 

 a scene as cannot fail both to instruct and 



