PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



alarm all such as have any degree of in- 

 terested concern for themselves, or of a 

 benevolent one for others. 



66. Our original bodily structure, and 

 the impressions ,-xnd associations which af- 

 fect us in passing through life, are so 

 much alike, and yet not the same, that 

 there must be both a great general re- 

 semblance among mankind in respect of 

 their mental pleasures and pains, and al- 

 so many particular differences. 



67. Some degree of spirituality (that is, 

 that state of mind in which the pleasures 

 and pains are not sensible), is the neces- 

 sary consequence of passsing through 

 life. The sensible pleasures and pains 

 must be transferred by association more 

 and more every day, upon things which 

 of themselves afford neither pleasure nor 

 pain. 



68. Let the letters a, 6, c, d, e, &c. re- 

 present the sensible pleasures, and x, y, 

 and z, the sensible pains, supposing them 

 to be only three in number; and let us 

 suppose all these, botli pleasures and 

 pains, to be equal to each in degree. If 

 now the ideas of these sensible pleasures 

 and pains be associated together, accord- 

 ing to all the possible varieties, in order 

 to form intellectual pleasures and pains, 

 it is plain, that pleasure must prevail in 

 all the combinations of seven or more let- 

 ters ; and also, that when the several 

 parts of these complex pleasures are suf- 

 ficiently blended by association, the pains 

 which enter into their composition will 

 no longer be distinguished separately, 

 but the resulting mixed and complex 

 pleasures will appear to be pure and sim- 

 ple ones, equal in quantity to the excess 

 of pleasure above pain, in each combina- 

 tion. Thus association would convert a 

 state in which pleasure and pain are both 

 perceived by turns, into one in which 

 pure pleasure would alone be perceived; 

 at least would cause the beings who were 

 under its influence to any indefinite de- 

 gree, to approach to this last state near- 

 er than by any definite distance. Xo\v, 

 though the circumstances of mankind are 

 not the same with those here supposed, 

 yet they bear a great resemblance to 

 them, during that part of our existence 

 which is exposed to our observation ; for 

 our sensible pleasures are far more nu- 

 merous than our sensible pains? and 

 though the pains are in general greater 

 than the pleasures, yet the sum total of 

 the latter is probably greater than that of 

 the former ; whence the remainder, after 

 the destruction of the pains by the oppo- 



site and equal pleasures, will be pure 

 pleasure. 



69. The intellectual pleasures and 

 pains are as real as the sensible ones, be- 

 ing, in fact, nothing but the sensible plea- 

 sures and pains variously mixed and 

 blended together? They are also all 

 equally of a factitious and acquired na- 

 ture ; and we must therefore estimate all 

 of the pleasures equally, by their magni- 

 tude, permanency, and tendency to pro- 

 duce others ; and the pains in like man- 

 ner. 



Of the Affections and Passions. 



70. Affections, passions, and emotions, 

 may be considered as the re-action of the 

 mind towards those objects which directly, 

 or indirectly, produce pleasure or pain. 

 Supposing that by association a very com- 

 plex, pleasurable feeling has been so con- 

 nected with any object, as to be excited 

 by the sensation or idea of that object; 

 by degrees the object is considered as 

 the source of that feeling, and the plea- 

 surable feeling blended with the idea of 

 the object, being the indirect or immedi- 

 ate source of it, is called love ; the con- 

 trary feeling, produced by contrary asso- 

 ciations, is called hatred. (We do not 

 here speak of the particular modifications 

 of these feelings, or of their restrictions, 

 but of the general feelings excited in our 

 minds by objects causing, or supposed to 

 cause, pleasurable or painful feeling). 

 When either of them, (the love, for in- 

 stance,) is habitually connected with any 

 object, it is culled an affection for that 

 object; and all its various modifications, 

 however, and in whatever degree pro- 

 duced, if they are more than the ebulli- 

 tions of the moment, being permanent 

 feelings ready to be excited by the ap- 

 propriate object in appropriate situations, 

 are also termed affections. If from any 

 strength in the exciting cause, or pecu- 

 liar sensibility of the frame, or peculiarly 

 vivid associations, connected with objects 

 of a specific cast, that cause or produce u 

 vivid excitement of feeling, which 

 (though it may last perhaps for a consi- 

 derable time, if not excessive in fl 

 gradually loses its vividness, and altoge- 

 ther ceases, or settles down into a more 

 permanent, but less active feeling, that 

 vivid, vigorous feeling is denominated u 

 pnssion. The mind may have such a pre- 

 disposition to a certain set of p:. 



that these may be easily excited, and by 

 every such excitement increase the pv$- 



