PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



disposition to future excitement, and add 

 to the strength and vividness of the more 

 permanent corresponding affections, but 

 the excitement iiself, and its effect, the 

 passion, cannot, Irom the nature of the 

 nnud, lust long-. From this account it 

 may appear, that the passions and affec- 

 tions differ from each other principally in 

 their degree and duration. There is a 

 third class of feelings, which may more 

 properly be called emotions, than eidier 

 passions or affections ; where the pleasur- 

 able or painful feelings are not explicitly 

 referred to the exciting cause, and have 

 not that vividness and strength which is 

 essential to a passion, they are states of 

 pleasure or of pain, following the excite- 

 ment of some affection, and generally ac- 

 companied or blended with trains of con- 

 ceptions and thoughts. We are aware 

 that we do not use this term in the sense 

 in which Dr. Cogan professes to employ 

 it; but we doubt, whether in this instance 

 the usual penetration and accuracy of 

 that philosopher have accompanied him ; 

 and as it appears to us, his own use of it 

 is essentially different from that given in 

 his definition, in which he confines it " to 

 the external marks or visible changes 

 produced by the impetus of the passions 

 upon the corporeal system." A tenden- 

 cy to the exercise of affections, and to 

 the excitement of emotions or passions, is 

 called a disposition : in those cases in 

 which the disposition is habitual, and re- 

 gulates a considerable proportion of the 

 affections or passions, it seems appropri- 

 ately termed the temper. 



71. Respecting the classes of affections, 

 passions, and emotions, we must not here 

 enlarge. It is a most copious and difficult 

 subject; and, as pursued with different 

 objects, different classifications appear 

 preferable. Supposing the object to be, 

 to take these feelings as they are, and to 

 arrange them so as to show their relation- 

 ship, and tendency to affect one another, 

 having in view the phenomena rather 

 than the causes of them, we should be 

 led to give a decided preference to the 

 elegant arrangement of Dr. Cogan, in his 

 vei-v \aluable work, on the passions; but 

 if it be to trace them to their sources, in 

 order to show how they are formed, di- 

 rectly or indirectly, of the relics of sen- 

 sations, and modified by the various com- 

 binations of them, which is an object of 

 the greatest importance, as has been al- 

 ready observed, Dr. Hartley's arrange- 

 ment, even if somewhat deficient in phi- 

 losophical accuracy, as perhaps Dr. Co- 

 ran has shown, must have the prefer- 

 VOl 



having been founded on that object. l*h 

 arrangement of Dr. Cogna is by himself 

 stated as follows : " \\lien the nature of 

 ,','mg- cause is more accurately as- 

 certained, it will be found to respoo; ei- 

 ther the !>elnsh or the social principle. 

 Hence arise two important distinctions, 

 forming two different classes. In each 

 class, the predominant idea of a good, 

 and the predominent idea of an evil, will 

 constitute two different orders. The 

 leading passions and affections under 

 each order, point out the genera. The 

 complicated nature of some of the pas 

 sions, and other contingent circumstan- 

 ces, may be considered species and va- 

 rieties under each characteristic genus." 

 Dr. Hartley's arrangement is two-fold 

 first, the passions and affections in gene- 

 ral ; secondly, the passions and affections, 

 as excited by the different classes of in- 

 tellectual pleasures and pains. Respect- 

 ing the latter, we shall have an opportu- 

 nity of speaking under the different class- 

 es I we shall here briefly state the ar- 

 rangement of the general passions and 

 affections. As all the passions and affec- 

 tions arise from pleasure and pain, the 

 first and most general distribution is into 

 Jove and hatred. When these are ex- 

 cited to a certain degree, they stimulate 

 us to action, and may then be termed de- 

 sire, or aversion, understanding by the 

 last word, active hatred. Hope and fear 

 arise from the probability or uncertainty 

 of obtaining the good desired, or of avoid- 

 ing the evil slimmed. Joy and grief are 

 love or hatred exerted towards an object 

 when present, so as to occupy the whole 

 attention of the mind. After the actual 

 joy or grief is over, and the object with- 

 drawn, there generally remains a pleas- 

 ing or displeasing recollection, which re- 

 curs with ei -vence of the idea 

 i>t tue object, or of the associated ones, 

 and keeps up the love or hatred. These 

 ten, five grateful, and. live ungrateful, 

 passions or affections, Dr. Hartley consi- 

 comprehending all the general 

 passions of human nature. 



OF THE CLASSES OF INTELLECTUAL 

 PLEASURES AND PAINS, WI I H A 

 SPECIFIC ACCOUNT OF THEIR ORI- 

 GIN. 



72. The intellectual pleasures and 

 pains are arranged by Hartley in six class- 

 es. Perhaps the arrangement, and cer- 

 tainly the appellations of the classes, are 

 not unexceptionable j but so much light 



L I 



