PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



Steps and associations must frequently 

 appear; and hence it forces on the mind 

 a more constant reference to its tendency 

 to promote the happiness of the 'indi- 

 vidual possessor. The other pleasures 

 have, in general, a far greater share of 

 indirect associations with previous plea- 

 sures, and acquire the power of gratify- 

 ing, not so much from being the mani- 

 fest causes of other gratifications, as their 

 most common adjuncts; whereas money 

 is generally the most visible of all the 

 causes. 



84. Honour, power, learning, and many 

 other things, are however pursued in part 

 after the name manner, and tor the same 

 reasons, as riches, viz. from a tacit sup- 

 position that the acquisition of every de- 

 gree of these is treasuring up a propor. 

 tional degree of happiness, to he produced 

 and enjoyed at pleasure. And the desires 

 of each of these would, in like manner, 

 increase perpetually during life, did they 

 not curb one another by many mutual in- 

 consistencies, or were not all damped by 

 the frequent experience and recollection, 

 that all the means of happiness cease to 

 be so, when the body or mind cease to be 

 disposed in a manner proper for their re- 

 ception. It is also worthy of observation, 

 that riches, honours, power, learning, 

 and all other things which are considered 

 as means of happiness, become means to 

 each other in a great variety of ways, thus 

 transferring upon each oiher all the as- 

 sociated pleasures which they collect 

 from other quarters, and approaching 

 nearer and nearer, perpetually, to a per- 

 fect similarity and sameness with each 

 other, in the instantaneous pleasures 

 which they afford when pursued and ob- 

 tained as ends. It appears, likewise, that 

 all aggregates of pleasure thus collected 

 by them all, must, from the structure of 

 our frame, and of the world which sur- 

 rounds us, be made at last to centre and 

 rest upon Him, who is the inexhaustible 

 fountain of all power, knowledge, good- 

 ness, majesty, glory, property, &c. ; so 

 that even avarice and ambition are in their 

 respective ways carrying on his benevo- 

 lent and all-wise designs. And the same 

 thing may be hoped of every other pas- 

 sion and pursuit ; one may hope that 

 they all agree and unite in leading to ul- 

 timate happiness and perfection. How- 

 ever, they differ greatly in their present 

 consequences, and in their future ones, 

 reaching to certain intervals of time inde- 

 finite and unknown to us, and thus be- 

 coming good or evil, both naturally and 

 morally, in respect of us and our limited 



apprehensions, judgments, and anticipa- 

 tions. And yet one may humb y Iv.pe, 

 that every thing must be ultimately good, 

 both naturally and morally 



4. Of the Pleasures and Pains of Sympathy. 



85. The sympathetic affections, or 

 those b\ which we ftel when others feel, 

 may be divided into four clashes : those 

 by uiiich we rejoice at the happiness of 

 others, those by which we grieve for 

 their misery, those by which we i ejoice 

 at their misery, and 'those by which we 

 grieve at their happiness O( the. first 

 kind, are sociality, good-will, generosity, 

 and gratitude ; of the second, compassion 

 and mercy ; of the third, moroseness, an- 

 ger, revenge, jealousy, cruelty, and ma- 

 lice ; and, of the fourth, envy. It is easy 

 to be conceived that association should 

 produce affections of all tl^e four kinds ; 

 since, in the intercourses of life, the plea- 

 sures and pains of one person are, in va- 

 rious ways, intermixed with, and de-pen- 

 dent upon, those of others, so that com- 

 pounds of their relicts are excited in nil 

 the possible ways in which the happiness 

 or misery of one person can be combined 

 with the happiness or misery of another, 

 viz. in the lour above mentioned. We 

 have already entered so much at length 

 into (he rise and progress of the benevo- 

 lent affections, ( 41 47.) that we deem 

 it most expedient to give here the analy- 

 sis of the third class, those by which we 

 rejoice at the misery of others, previously 

 stating Hartley's application of the terms 

 above mentioned. Sociality is the plea- 

 sure we take in the company and conver- 

 sation of others, particularly of our friends 

 and acquaintance. Good-will (or benevo- 

 lence in its more limited sense) is that 

 pleasing affection which engages us to 

 promote the welfare of others to the best 

 of our power. Generosity is that modifi- 

 cation of benevolence which disposes us 

 to forego great pleasures, or to endure 

 great pains for the benefit of others. Gra- 

 titude is that modification of benevolence 

 which arises from the past reception of 

 favours, leading to make every practica- 

 ble return of good to our benefactor. 

 Compassion is the uneasiness vrhich 

 man feels at the misery of another. Met 

 cy is compassion exercised towards 

 who has forfeited his title to happiness 

 or the removal of misery, by some < 

 rit, particularly against ourselves, 

 roseness is that disposition which lez 

 us to be dissatisfied with the efforts 

 others for our comforts, to be 



