PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



at their innocent enjoyments, and to feel 

 a pleasure in imposing restraints upon 

 their satisfactions. Anger is a sudden 

 star, oi' passion, by which men wish und 

 endeavour harm to others. Hevenge 

 prompts to inflict and rejoice in evil, in 

 return for evil real or supposed. Malice 

 deliberately wishes the misery of others. 

 Cruelty disposes men to take delight in 

 inflicting pain, and in contemplating mi- 

 sery. Jealousy arises from the suspicion 

 of a rival in the affections of a person of 

 the other sex- Envy is live disposition by 

 which we consider the good things pos- 

 sessed by others as a diminution of our 

 own happiness, and grieve at their enjoy- 

 ment ot them. 



86. Moroseness, peevishness, severity, 

 &c. are most apt to arise in those persons 

 who have some real or imagined supe- 

 riority over others, which either magnifies 

 their failures of duty, or at least renders 

 the individual very attentive to such fail- 

 ures. Bodily infirmities and frequent 

 disappointments, by making the common 

 intercourses of life insipid, and enhancing 

 small injuries ; delicacy and effeminacy, 

 by increasing the sensibility both of bony 

 and of mind with respect to pain and un- 

 easiness ; luxury, by producing unnatu- 

 ral cravings, which clash not only with 

 the like cravings of others, but also with 

 the common course and conveniences of 

 life; and, in short, all kinds of selfishness 

 have the same effects upon the temper. 

 The severe scrutiny which persons sin- 

 cerely penitent for past departures from 

 duty make into their own lives, and the 

 rigid censures which they pass on their 

 own actions, are often found in proud and 

 passionate tempers, to raise such indigna- 

 tion against vice, as breaks out into an 

 undue severity of language and behaviour 

 with respect to others ; and this especial- 

 ly, if they seem to themselves to have 

 overcome all great vices, and are not yet 

 arrived at a due sense of the many latent 

 defects still remaining in them. And this 

 is much increased by all opinions which 

 represent the Supreme Being as implaca- 

 ble towards a part of his creatures, and 

 this part as reprobate towards him. By 

 all which we may see, that every thing 

 which makes disagreeable impress-ions on 

 our minds at the same time that our fel- 

 low creatures are present, with us, in sen- 

 sation or in idea, and especially if these 

 be^connected by the relation of cause and 

 effect, Sec. will in fact produce in us mo- 

 roseness and peevishness. This follows 

 from the doctrine of association, and is 

 also an evident fact. It is likewise a 



strong argument for cheerfulness, and 

 the pleasures of innocent moderate 

 mirth. 



87. Anger and revenge may be analys- 

 ed as follows. The appearance, idea, ap- 

 proach, actual attack, <kc. of any thing 

 from which a child has received harm,, 

 must by the law of association raise in 

 his mind the relict of that harm. The 

 same harm often arises from different 

 causes ; and different harms from the 

 same cause : these harms and causes have 

 an affinity with each other : and thus 

 they are variously mixed and blended to- 

 gether ; so that a general confused idea 

 of harm, with the uneasy state of the ner- 

 vous system, and the consequent activity 

 of the parts, are raised up in young chil- 

 dren upon certain appearances and cir- 

 cumstances. By degiees, the denials ot 

 gratifications, and many intellectual ag- 

 gregates, with all the signs and tokens of 

 them, raise up a like uneasiness by the 

 law of association. And thus it happens, 

 that when any harm has been received, 

 any gratification denied, or other mental 

 uneasiness occasioned, a long train of as- 

 sociated relicts of painful impressions en- 

 hance the displeasing feeling, and conti- 

 nue it much beyond its natural state. 

 This is the nascent state of the passion 

 of anger, in which it is nearly allied to 

 fear, being in the continuance of the same 

 internal feelings, quickened on the one 

 hand by the actual painful or uneasy im- 

 pression, but on the other moderated by 

 the absence of the apprehension of future 

 danger. By degrees the child learns, 

 from observation and imitation, to use va- 

 rious muscular exertions, words, gestures, 

 &c. in order to ward off or remove the 

 causes of uneasiness or pain, and so goes 

 on multiplying perpetually, by further 

 and further associations, both the occa- 

 sions of anger and the expressions of it; 

 and, in particular, associates the idea of 

 hurting 1 another, with the apprehension or 

 actual receiving of harm from that other, 

 As men grow up to adult age, and dis- 

 tinguish living creatures from things in- 

 animate, rational and moral agents from 

 irrational ones, they learn to refer effects 

 to their more ultimate causes, and thus 

 their resentment passes from the inani- 

 mate instrument to the living agent, es- 

 pecially if this latter be rational and mo- 

 ral. When the moral ideas of just and 

 unjust, right and wrong, merit and de- 

 merit, have been acquired, and applied to 

 the actions and circumstances of human 

 life, in the manner to be hereafter de- 

 scribed, the internal feelings of this class 



