PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



see how, after a sufficient repetition of 

 the proper associations, the sound of the 

 wprdi grasp, take hold, &c. the sight of 

 the nurse's hand in a state of contraction, 

 the conception of a hand in that state, 

 and innumerable otlie^' associated cir- 

 cumstances, that is, sensations, ideas, and 

 motions, will produce the action of grasp- 

 ing 1 , till, in consequence of the action of 

 grasping being found to answer certain 

 purposes which are wished for, that state 

 of mind which we may call the will to 

 grasp is generated, and sufficiently asso- 

 ciated with the action to produce it in- 

 stantaneously. It is therefore perfectly 

 voluntary in this case : and by the innu- 

 merable repetitions of it in this perfectly 

 voluntary state, it comes, at last, to obtain 

 a sufficient connection with so many sen- 

 sorial changes, either sensitive, ideal, or 

 motory, that (whether or not the} 7 are so 

 vivid or so countenanced by the state of 

 mind as to excite the consciousness,) it 

 follows them in the same manner as ori- 

 ginally automatic actions do the corres- 

 ponding sensations, that is, to be secon- 

 darily automatic. And in the same man- 

 ner may all the actions performed with 

 the hands be explained, all those which 

 are very familiar in life passing from the 

 original automatic state through the se- 

 veral degrees of voluntariness, till they 

 become perfectly voluntary, and then re- 

 passing through the same degrees in an 

 inverted order, till they become seconda- 

 rily automatic on many occasions, though 

 still perfectly voluntary on some occa- 

 sions, viz. whensoever an express act of 

 the will is concerned. A more interest- 

 ing though more complicated case is that 

 of the employment of the organs of 

 speech, for which we refer our readers 

 to Hartley's Observations, vol. i. p. 106, 

 or Priestley's Abridgment, p. 33. 



103. We may hence understand in 

 what manner the first rudiments are laid 

 of that faculty of imitation which is so ob- 

 servable in young children. They see 

 the actions of their own hands, they hear 

 themselves pronounce. Hence the im- 

 pressions made by themselves on their 

 own eyes and ears become associated cir- 

 cumstances, and consequently must, in 

 clue time, excite to the repetition of the 

 actions. Hence like impressions made on 

 their eyes and ears by others, will have 

 the same effect; or in other words, they 

 will learn to imitate the actions which 

 they see, and the sounds which they hear. 

 Imitation is a great source of the volun- 

 tary power, and makes ail the several 



modes of walking, handling, and 

 ing, ike. conformable to those of the ago 

 and nation in which a person Hyes, and hi 

 particular to those of the persons with 

 whom he converses. Besides the two 

 sources of it just mentioned, it has many 

 others. Some oT these are, the resem- 

 blance which children observe between 

 their own bodies, with all the functions 

 of them, and those of others ; the plea- 

 sures which they experience in and by- 

 means of all imitative motions ; the di- 

 rections and encouragements given to 

 them on this head; the high opinions 

 which they form of the power and happi- 

 ness of adults ; and their consequent de- 

 sire to resemble them in these, and in all 

 their associated circumstances. Imitation 

 begins in the several kinds of voluntary 

 actions about the same time, and increas- 

 es not only by the sources alledged, but 

 also by the mutual influence of every in- 

 stance of it over every other, so that the 

 velocity of its growth is greatly accele- 

 rated for some time. It is of the highest 

 consequence to children in their attain- 

 ment of accomplishments, bodily and 

 mental. And thus every thing to which 

 mankind have a natural tendency, is 

 learned much sooner in society than the 

 mere natural tendency would produce it; 

 and many things are learned so early, 

 and fixed so deeply, as to appear parts of 

 our nature, though they may be mere de- 

 rivatives and acquisitions. 



OF THE SECONDARY POWERS OF THE 



104. We did not set out with the hope 

 of giving a complete outline of the most 

 extensive subject of this article ; but our 

 readers will probably think us unneces- 

 sarily deficient, if we say nothing respect- 

 ing memory, conception, judgment, at- 

 tention, abstraction, imagination, and will, 

 which in books on the philosophy of the 

 human mind constitute so important a 

 part ; and though we think the operation 

 of the associative power of such extent, 

 that separate from mere sensation and re- 

 tention this ever active principle will fur- 

 nish a sufficient explanation of all the 

 phenomena of intellect and affection, we 

 agree with Mr. Stewart, that the com- 

 mon classification, having certainly some 

 foundation in nature, should by no means 

 be neglected. We shall accordingly, in 

 the remainder of this article, and in those 

 to which we shall now refer our readers, 

 endeavour to give them such a view of 



