PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



the secondary faculties as may serve for 

 the purposes which we originally propos- 

 ed for ourselves. See UNDKIISTASHIXG, 

 or Judgment, in which, in connection with 

 the article WOMBS, we shall endeavour to 

 lay before our readers a summary view of 

 the highly important principles of Hart- 

 ley, respecting 1 those phenomena of the 

 human mind which he classes under the 

 head of understanding, or " that faculty 

 by which we contemplate mere sensa- 

 tions and ideas, pursue truth, and assent 

 to, or dissent from, propositions." The 

 passions, affections, pleasures, and pains, 

 are usually referred to the general head 

 of will : respecting them we have already 

 spoken at large. Of the other secondary 

 powers of the mind, we shall here give a 

 very short account, referring our readers 

 to the " Elements of Dugald Stewart," (a 

 work which we earnestly wish to see 

 completed) for various sound and com- 

 prehensive views respecting them, mix- 

 ed, we must confess, with several things 

 in which we cannot agree, but which are 

 so written as to delight even those whom 

 they will not convince. We shall expect 

 a most rapid progress of the Hartleyan 

 philosophy, if the principles of it should 

 ever be detailed in the imposing manner 

 in which Mr. Stewart has given his to the 

 public. 



MEMORY. 



105. The memory is defined by Hart- 

 ley to be that faculty by which traces of 

 sensations and ideas recur, or are recall, 

 ed, in the same order and proportion, ac- 

 curately or nearly, in which they were 

 once actually presented. The rudiments 

 of memory are laid in the perpetual re- 

 currency of the same impressions, or 

 groups of impressions. These, by the 

 operations of the retentive power, leave 

 traces or relicts ; and by the operation of 

 the associative power, these are united in 

 the order in which they were presented 

 to the mind. Now, the single sensible 

 impressions and small groups of them be- 

 ing few, in comparison of all the large 

 groups, they recur the most frequently, 

 so as sooner to produce the elements of 

 memory. 



106. Suppose a person to have so far 

 advanced in life as to have acquired all 

 these elements; that is, that he has ideas 

 of the common appearances and occur- 

 rences of life, under a considerable varie- 

 ty of subordinate circumstances, which 

 readily recur to his mind by slight causes, 

 he will be thus easily enabled to retrace 



other occurrences ; for these will consist 

 either of the old impressions variously 

 combined, or of new ones in some way or 

 other connected with them. This may 

 be exemplified and explained by the cir- 

 cumstance, that it is difficult to remem- 

 ber even well-known words which have- 

 no connection with each other; and still 

 more so words which are neither fami- 

 liar, nor formed according to familiar 

 analogies ; but that, on the other hand, 

 persons acquainted with any branch of 

 science or of art, very easily retain facts 

 connected with it which were previously 

 unknown. The recollection of ideas is 

 also greatly aided by the connection of 

 words, both with them and with the ori- 

 ginal impressions ; for words being, from 

 the constant use of language, familiar to 

 persons of moderate mental culture, even 

 in various combinations, they are easily 

 retained, and most materially assist in 

 producing the recurrence of the corres- 

 ponding ideas. And thus, when a per- 

 son is relating a past fact, the ideas in 

 some cases suggest the words, and in 

 others, the words suggest the ideas. 

 Hence illiterate persons, other things be- 

 ing equal, do not remember nearly so 

 well as others. Hence also the import- 

 ance, contrary to the views of education 

 which a few years ago were so fashion- 

 able, of teaching the young to remember 

 words as well as things ; for in most cases, 

 as words serve as the bond of ideas, 

 ideas will be loose and floating in the 

 mind, unless connected with words. 



107. The difference between ideas and 

 sensations principally consists in the great- 

 er vividness and distinctness of the lat- 

 ter ; but cases are known to occur, iu 

 which visual conceptions are so vivid and 

 distinct, that they are mistaken for actual 

 sensations. This is particularly the case 

 when, in consequence of disease, the sys- 

 tem is peculiarly susceptible of excite- 

 ment; and sometimes when the mind is 

 very much absorbed in contemplating its 

 own ideas, so that the impressions from 

 external objects produce little effect up- 

 on it. It is a fertile source of those ideas 

 respecting apparitions, which are so pre- 

 valent among persons of physical sensibi- 

 lity, without that culture of the intellect, 

 which would enable them to attend to 

 their own thoughts and manner of think- 

 ing. Such lively recollections of past 

 impressions may, however, be usually dis- 

 tinguished from sensations, by allowing 

 the attention to relax, so that they ma}' 

 cease to be forcibly detained as objects of 

 consciousness, when it will, in general, 



