PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



is apparently certain, and those who are 

 endeavouring to form their minds to habits 

 of study and reflection, know from con- 

 stant experience that ihey have it not un- 

 der their command. So far from having 

 an original power of excluding vivid ideas 

 or sensations, to give our attention to those 

 which, though most certainly demanding 

 it, do not make the same lively impression 

 upon the mind, it is a habit which requires 

 the strictest and severest discipline to pro- 

 duce it ; it is a possession honourable, and 

 invaluable, but like every other of impor- 

 tance, not the acquisition of the moment, 

 but of a long continued course of rigor- 

 ous, and in many cases, of painful exer- 

 tion. And when the habit of attention is 

 formed, that is, when we can produce the 

 state of mind called attention by a voli- 

 tion, how much may fairly be attributed 

 to the nature of the object, which, though, 

 perhaps, at first uninteresting, becomes 

 pleasing and impressive, and thus produ- 

 ces that state by the original laws of our 

 constitution. It even appears probable 

 that the person who has formed such ha- 

 bits of attention to a particular science, 

 as to be able to give it his undivided at- 

 tention, would be almost as incapable of 

 directing it to frivolous object^, as to a 

 science to which habitual attention, or the 

 nature of the subject, does not give any 

 charms, as he was when he first entered 

 upon his pursuits. In a word, when we 

 take into consideration the circumstances 

 that our attention is never undivided, ex- 

 cept to those things which are calculated 

 to engage it, either by the original agreea- 

 bleness of their nature, or that which they 

 acquire in proportion as our habits be- 

 come confirmed, and that the associative 

 faculty may, and in many instances does, 

 form a connection between the mental 

 states we call attention and volition ; we 

 have probably then sufficient data to ac- 

 count for the phenomena of attention, 

 without calling in the aid of a new facul- 

 ty- 

 US. Abstraction is defined by Mr. 

 Stewart, the faculty by which the mind 

 separates the combinations which are 

 presented to it. This definition, so far as 

 it goes, appears to be very correct ; but 

 if the processes of generalization are in- 

 tended to be contained in it, it is by no 

 means sufficient ; as will immediately ap- 

 pear from the slightest consideration of 

 that mental process. Abstraction, in this 

 acceptation, is indeed " essentially sub- 

 servient to every act of classification :" 

 but by no means comprehends that act in 

 the number of its functions. Though 



we cannot agree with Mr. Stewart in aU 

 his statements in his chapter on attention, 

 we must in this position, that the mind 

 " cannot attend at one and the same instant 

 to objects which we can attend to sepa- 

 rately." If this be the case, what is abstrac- 

 tion but attention directed to particular 

 objects, owing either to something vivid 

 in the sensations they excite, or to the 

 frequency of their recurrence ? in tact, 

 subject to all the laws of attention, per- 

 fectly involuntary in early life, and after- 

 wards becoming, to a certain degree, vo- 

 luntary, by means of a strong association 

 formed between the states of mind called 

 volition and attention. 



1 19. In speaking of the process of ge- 

 neialization, some observations will apply 

 to the process of abstraction separately 

 considered. We shall therefore proceed 

 to consider the formation of general or 

 abstract notions ; a process in which the 

 mind is most usually passive ; which 

 seems capable of satisfactory explana- 

 tion upon the principle of the associative 

 powers, and apparently cannot be ex- 

 plained without it. 



120. Sensible objects, and particularly 

 visible, are undoubtedly the first which 

 exercise the power of abstraction, or se- 

 parate attention, arid here the process ap- 

 pears plain. The object makes its ap- 

 propriate impression upon the organs of 

 sense, and when withdrawn leaves in the 

 mind an idea. Another sensation is re- 

 ceived from an object bearing strong fea- 

 tures of similarity to the former; by the 

 laws of association it calls up the idea it 

 produced, and becomes associated with it. 

 Other similar objects are presented, and 

 the features in which they agree being 

 the most frequently called up, engage 

 most the attention of the mind, and thus 

 becoming, in some degree, separate from 

 the objects which originally were con- 

 nected with them, constitute the abstract 

 idea. The readiness with which these 

 circumstances of resemblance recal the 

 idea or conception of the individuals from 

 which they were abstracted, depends 

 upon the habits of the individual, and tl 

 number of objects from which the ab- 

 stract notion was formed. If we had seei 

 but two or three sheep, it is probable that 

 the circumstances of resemblance woulc" 

 be so connected in our minds with tl 

 individuals, that one or more of thei 

 would be constantly called up when con- 

 sidering the circumstances of reser 

 blance ; but if the number be mud 

 greater, that is, if the circumstances 

 resemblance have been frequently in 



