PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



mind, particular individuals much less 

 frequently, tiie notion of these circum- 

 stances of resemblance becomes some- 

 what disjointed from the objects by which 

 it was formed. And though it is proba- 

 bly impossible to have a general idea of 

 any class of objects merely sensible, with- 

 out the idea of an individual being- pre- 

 sent in the mind; yet from the causes I 

 have mentioned, the general features of 

 resemblance not being particularly con- 

 nected with any individual, those features 

 only are strong and vivid, and call the at- 

 tention of the mind, while all the other 

 circumstances of dissimilarity have no ef- 

 fect upon it, and do not attract its atten- 

 tion. 



121- The procedure of the mind ap- 

 pears to be exactly the same, though less 

 obvious, and usually more difficult of 

 analysis, when the general idea is more 

 remote from sensation, when in fact, the 

 notions of the quality, or qualities, even 

 in the individual, may be very complex, 

 and this in proportion, as it is more intel- 

 lectual and refined. In the former class 

 of general notions, and even in some in- 

 stances of the present, where the quality 

 is definite and obvious, it is probable that 

 language would not be requisite for the 

 formation of ideas; indeed, if the above 

 account be just, it cannot be requisite. 

 For the abstraction, so far as it is invo- 

 luntary, is solely the effect of the fre- 

 quent recurrence of some particular quali- 

 ties with which they are occasionally 

 combined. But those abstract ideas in 

 which the circumstances of resemblance 

 between the composing ideas are not very 

 obvious or very distinct, either would not 

 have been formed at all by the bulk of 

 mankind, or at least would have been ve- 

 ry confused. We can go very far with 

 those who contend, that general ideas 

 would not exist in the mind without the 

 medium of language ; but that they could 

 not, from any deficiency of mental capa- 

 city to form them, does by no means ap- 

 pear certain. The same faculties which 

 now produce them, might have produced 

 them without the powers of communica- 

 tion ; and there appears no reason why 

 the deaf and dumb child may not form a 

 general idea of men, or horses, or fire, or 

 any object of a similar kind, as well as if 

 capable of annexing terms to the objects 

 of perception. 



122. It can be no objection to this ac- 

 count of the procedure of the mind in 

 generalization, that we are able to form 

 classifications of objects from circum- 

 stances which are not calculated to strike 



VOL. V 



the mind of the common observer. When 

 left to itself, before habits of reflection are 

 formed, the mind will be necessarily at- 

 tracted by the most prominent sensible 

 features o"f resemblance, and the objects 

 would become associated by that bond of 

 union ; and in very many cases this 

 would differ in different individuals; but 

 it is indubitable, that we may acquire such 

 a command over our associations, that 

 we may be able to combine objects in our 

 minds which have no customary tendency 

 to such combination, owing to the laws of 

 association, by a more factitious connec- 

 tion, and that, by the requisite culture of 

 the mind, certain connecting principles 

 are either discovered or confirmed, which 

 could not have been of any force in a 

 more early period of mental progress. 

 In the first of these cases the association, 

 is voluntary, and if there were not some 

 apparent benefit resulting from iti or 

 some circumstances calculated to pro- 

 duce it in the mind, it would soon give 

 place to a more natural union. So far, 

 however, as any general idea is formed, 

 its production is accomplished agreeably 

 to the principles we have stated. In the 

 second, the operation of the mind is most 

 usually involuntary ; when voluntary, the 

 observations on the first cease to apply. 



123. It is obvious that, the fewer 

 and more distinct the circumstances 

 which are comprehended under the ge- 

 neral notion of a class of objects, the 

 more clear and definite will be the gene- 

 neral notion itself. And it appears wor- 

 thy of notice, and tends to confirm the 

 account given of the formation of our ge- 

 neral ideas, at least those of visible ob- 

 jects, that the greater the variety subsist- 

 ing among the individuals or subordinate 

 species comprehended under the general 

 idea, or, more properly, which possess 

 that quality, or combination of qualities, 

 which compose the general idea, the less 

 attention, other things being equal, do 

 we pay to the peculiarities of the individu- 

 al. Thus the general notion of a trian- 

 gle is merely that of a figure having three 

 sides ; and the varieties of triangles ara 

 innumerable : and, agreeably to the opi- 

 nion already mentioned, though we cer- 

 tainly cannot form a conception of a tri- 

 angle which shall be representative cf all 

 others, without possessing the peculiari- 

 ties which constitute it an individual, yet 

 the circumstances of its having threes 

 sides is so finite, and our attention is SQ 

 thoroughly confined to it, that the pecu- 

 liarities ot the triangle are not unfrequent- 

 ly totally out or consideration ; and if, ovf- 



N n " 



