PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



Ing to some particular associations, the 

 triangle on such occasions were not usu- 

 ally the same, we should afterwards be 

 unable 10 say what kind of a triangle had 

 been in the view of our minds. 



124. To state the fact respecting con- 

 ceptions more generally ; if \ve attempt 

 to form a conception of any object, it 

 must, from the very nature of a concep- 

 tion, be individual, representative, per- 

 haps, of a numerous class, but still pos- 

 sessing those peculiar features which 

 constitute individuality. It may not be 

 improper to suggest, that the want of 

 attention to the difference between an 

 idea and conception may have, in some 

 measure, misled those philosophers who 

 have denied the existence of general 

 ideas. " The business of conception," 

 says Mr. Stewart, " is to present us with 

 an exact transcript of what we have felt 

 or perceived;" and, admitting the truth 

 of this, a conception is that transcript so 

 presented. We shall not enter into the 

 inquiry, whether conception be a dis- 

 tinct faculty of the mind: we may, how- 

 ever, state, that it appears to us to be 

 nothing different from memory, except 

 as being a branch of that general faculty; 

 and that a conception differs from an 

 idea, only as species does from genus; 

 that, in fact, without the aid of the asso- 

 ciative faculty, and with retention alone, 

 every idea would be merely a concep- 

 tion. For the recollection of an indi- 

 vidual sensation, or group of sensations, 

 whether seldom or frequently received, 

 is a conception ; but when a number of 

 sensations possessing some common fea- 

 tures, but in others differing, are received 

 into the mind, the ideas they form there 

 by the laws of association, coalesce with 

 one another, thus constituting these com- 

 plex ideas or states of mind, which never 

 from their very nature can be concep- 

 tions, but which yet may be distinct, and 

 when words are used to denote them, 

 the subjects of reasoning. 



125. To apply these remarks : Almost 

 an infinite variety of the sensations we 

 receive, are presented to our view so 

 constantly connected with others, that 

 however much it may be in the power of 

 the mind to attend to them in a separate 

 state, it is impossible to form a concep- 

 tion of them separately; but, on the other 

 hand, there are a considerable number 

 of qualities remote from mere sensation, 

 belonging to an extensive range of indi- 

 vidual objects, which may be considered 

 by the mind separate from those objects, 

 and have internal feelings or complex 



ideas attached to the terms which denote 

 them. Now, we apprehend, it is the 

 grand difference between our general 

 notions, when concerned about things 

 merely sensible, and those which we 

 might cull more purely intellectual, that 

 in the former case, the conceptions being 

 usually clear, and frequently very vivid, 

 are very easily brought up by the asso- 

 ciative power; and the circumstances of 

 distinction being few, and merely sensi- 

 ble, are, from their very nature, calcu- 

 lated to produce a conception; and so 

 little do we possess an abstractive power, 

 that it is in most cases impossible to do 

 this without introducing the conception 

 of the whole object: on the other hand, 

 the circumstances of distinction in the 

 latter case, are less definite ; they are 

 frequently extremely numerous, and are 

 seldom capable of exciting conceptions, 

 and consequently they do not readily call 

 up any particular individual object to 

 which the general term is applicable. 

 We acknowledge, very much, in these 

 latter respects, depends upon the peculiar 

 circumstances of the case, or upon the 

 habits of the individual. If a person had 

 been remarkably struck with an act of 

 justice, or of disinterested benevolence, 

 or any other, it is probable, that while 

 the vividness of the impression lasted, 

 he would never be able to think of these 

 qualities without the particular case 

 being recalled into the mind ; and if he 

 possessed a lively imagination, or had been 

 present at the performance of the virtu- 

 ous action, would form an immediate 

 conception of the whole scene. Or if a 

 person be not much in habits of specula- 

 tion, he would universally think of some 

 example of the action possessing those 

 qualities. But these circumstances, though 

 they tend to illustrate the operation of 

 the associative power, do not appear to 

 militate against the general truth of the 

 above remarks. 



126. The remarks we have made on 

 the subject of abstraction or generaliza- 

 tion, have been, in a considerable de- 

 gree, separate from language, or at least 

 supposing it not already formed. If 

 every person was left to form his own 

 classifications, language, in very many 

 instances, would be of little utility ; be- 

 cause the same features of resemblance 

 would not operate in the same way upon 

 different individuals. But the process 

 of the mind, when language is formed, is 

 somewhat different ; because in this case 

 it is restrained, and has not the si 

 bounded liberty of forming its 



