PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



xnents," (of which we believe we have 

 occasionally made use, without specific 

 acknowledgment), Locke's " Essay," 

 Dr. Priestley's "Abridgment" of Hartley, 

 Allison's "Essays on Taste," and Pro- 

 fessor Stewart's " Elements," as forming 

 a pretty complete course of reading on 

 Mental Philosophy. 



130. As we have made a reference 

 from METAPHYSICS to this article, our rea- 

 ders will probably expect from us some- 

 thing 1 more metaphysical than what they 

 will find in the foregoing part of it. We 

 are not among those who consider meta- 

 physics as that science, falsely so called, 

 which professes to enlarge human know- 

 ledge beyond the limits of the objects of 

 human contemplation, as the science of 

 essences, &c. ; but we must acknowledge 

 that we are disposed to allow a high rank 

 to a few only of those branches of meta- 

 physics which do not justly class under 

 the head of mental philosophy, or the 

 philosophy of the human mind. We re- 

 gard them as amusing speculations which 

 may serve to sharpen the activity of the 

 intellect, and which, confined within mo- 

 derate limits, may be safely indulged in 

 by those whose time and culture of intel- 

 lect allow of such indulgence ; but we 

 are no advocates for the young philoso- 

 pher spending his exertions upon them : 

 they may, and we are aware often do, 

 deeply interest the mind ; but few who 

 think much will be unwilling to allow 

 that an active imagination, or simply the 

 devotement of the mind to an object, 

 will create any interest in that object 

 which has no foundation in the real utility 

 of it. We make these remarks with no 

 wish to throw a stigma upon metaphysics 

 in general, but simply to lead our readers 

 to reject that stigma which many throw 

 upon the philosophy of the human mind, 

 but which belongs to some only of the 

 branches of metaphysics ; and of these, 

 principally to those which the good sense 

 of the present day regards merely as ob- 

 jeots of curiosity, notwithstanding the 

 efforts of the learned Harris to lead us 

 back again into all the vagaries of the 

 ancient philosophers. Whatever relates 

 to the properties of the mind, to the ope- 

 rations of intellect and affection, is of 

 high value in various points of view : as 

 Dugald Stewart justly remarks, the phi- 

 losophy of the mind, abstracted entirely 

 from that eminence which belongs to it 

 in consequence of its practical applica- 

 tions, may claim a distinguished rank 

 among those preparatory disciplines, 

 which Bishop Berkeley has happily com- 



pared to "the crops which are raised, 

 not for the sake of the harvest, but to be 

 ploughed in as a dressing to the land." 



131. Physics, including in its widest 

 extent natural history, is that grand divi- 

 sion of human knowledge which has for 

 its objects the properties, classifications, 

 and laws, of all those things which ailect 

 the senses; metaphysics, f*-srct TCI tyvrix.x, 

 comprehends all those speculations which, 

 have for their aim the properties, classi- 

 fication, and laws, of all those objects of 

 human thought which by sensation alone 

 could not be known to man. The ancient 

 metaphysics comprehended many objects 

 which can scarcely be said to lie w'ithin 

 the sphere of human knowledge, and 

 which are rather to be considered as the 

 reveries of imagination than as the reali- 

 ties of intellect ; with these the science of 

 metaphysics ought not to be confounded. 

 We cannot pretend to give a complete 

 enumeration of the objects of this sci- 

 ence, but it will not pi'obably be useless 

 to give such a statement and brief consi- 

 deration of them, as will at least more 

 fully explain than is perhaps generally 

 clone, what kind of knowledge it pro- 

 fesses to have in view. 



132. In the first place, metaphysics 

 comprehends all investigations respect- 

 ing the existence and attributes of the 

 Supreme Being. While we state this, 

 however, we admit that we use the term 

 in its widest extent. The most impor- 

 tant, because the most undeniable, and 

 generally convincing, of these investiga- 

 tions come under the head of natural 

 theology, which derives its proofs of the 

 existence and attributes of the Supreme 

 Being from the appearances of nature. 

 Revealed religion teaches us what God 

 himself has been pleased to make known 

 to us of his character : but this, though a 

 just foundation of belief on this point, 

 and the guide of sound philosophy, 

 scarcely comes under the head of philo- 

 sophy. Those religious investigations 

 which most properly class under tl 

 head of metaphysics, tend to prove tl 

 Divine existence" and attributes from cei 

 tain principles which are supposed to 

 indisputable, by a series of reasoning 

 together independent of the marks 

 design in the objects around us. Of thes 

 we think that those which are to be founc 

 at the beginning of the second volume 



" Hartley's Observations" are the n 

 satisfactory. He sets out with this prii 

 ciple, * something must have existed froi 

 all eternity,' which he thinks commai 

 an instantaneous necessary assent, or 



