PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



|| feast the contrary of which (viz. that 

 I there WHS a time when nothing existed) 

 I the nund of every one refuses to admit. 

 | He next proceeds to show, that ' there 

 j cannot have been a mere succession of 

 | finite dependent beings from all eternity; 

 I but there must exist at least one infinite 

 independent being 1 .' He concludes his 

 1 reasoning in proof of this proposition, 

 with a remark which we will quote, be- 

 c uise many, feeling themselves embar- 

 | rnssed with \vliat may justly be called the 

 metaphysical proof of the existence of 

 God, are apt to suppose, either that it 

 has no weight, or that there is in their 

 minds some wrong tendency, inental or 

 moral, which impedes a ready assent to 

 it. " Some of these (abstract metaphysi- 

 cal arguments) are more satisfactory to 

 one person, some to another ; but in all 

 there is something 1 of perplexity and 

 doubt, concerning the exact propriety of 

 expression, and method of reasoning, and 

 perhaps ever will be ; since the subject 

 is infinite, and we finite." Indeed, we 

 are decidedly of opinion, that any mind 

 Would justly be deemed an anomaly 

 which, after resisting assent to the proof, 

 a posteriori, fairly and attentively weighed 

 and understood, should be led by the 

 proof, a priori, to admit the existence of 

 a first cause : and we strongly incline to 

 the belief that the conviction which may 

 be supposed to be derived from the lat- 

 ter, is in reality founded upon a previous, 

 perhaps casual and even unintentional, 

 consideration of the former. 



133. This remark still more forcibly ap- 

 plies to the a priori arguments for the 

 attributes of God. It is supposed to fol- 

 low from the necessity of the existence 

 of an infinite, independent being, that he 

 necessarily is endued with infinite power 

 and knowledge. We admit that it by no 

 means follows, from what we think an in- 

 disputable position, viz- that no human 

 intellect could have inferred the one 

 from the other without the a posteriori 

 proof, that therefore this inference has 

 no force ; but we do think that it is on 

 the works of God alone that we can 

 found a full and satisfactory proof of his 

 power and knowledge ; when these are 

 admitted, however, we must resort to a 

 metaphysical, but simple argument, to 

 prove that they are unlimited. We do 

 not wish to lead our readers to the idea, 

 that Hartley confines his reasonings to the 

 /? priori argument for the attributes of 

 God ; for this is by no means the fact ; 

 and we beg leave strongly to recommend 



to those of our readers who have not pre- 

 viously attended to them, those parts of 

 -his works which relate to the Supreme 

 Being ; we consider them as a treasure of 

 profound reflections, which will serve as 

 a clue to numberless difficulties, which 

 may have perplexed and distressed the 

 mind on the respective subjects. 



134. Many proceed further in the me- 

 taphysical arguments respecting the at- 

 tributes of God, and endeavour to prove, 

 that the infinite, independent Being, pos- 

 sessed of infinite power and knowledge, 

 must be infinitely benevolent. v 

 knowledge ourselves able to feel no 

 other ultimate proof of this position than, 

 (what abundantly proves the benevolence 

 of God, though perhaps not immediately 

 the infinite benevolence) the happiness 

 and tendencies to happiness which are 

 observable in the sentient beings which 

 fall under our notice. Admit the bene- 

 volence of God from his works, and then 

 the infinity of that benevolence may be 

 shewn by a simple metaphysical argu- 

 ment. " Since the qualities of benevo- 

 lence and malevolence are as opposite t 

 one another as light to darkness, they 

 cannot co-exist in the same simple, un- 

 changeable being. If, therefore, we can 

 prove God to be benevolent, from the 

 balance of happiness, malevolence must 

 be entirely excluded ; and we must sup- 

 pose the evils which we see and feel to 

 be owing to some other cause, however 

 unable we may be to assign this cause, or 

 to form any conceptions of it." The di- 

 vine benevolence, in every just view 

 which the human mind can take of it, in- 

 cludes every moral quality which can 

 exist in the divine mind ; holiness, jus- 

 tice, mercy, truth, all, as attributes of God, 

 are only modifications of benevolence : 

 we need not therefore pursue these con- 

 siderations further on this point. Con- 

 nected with the divine benevolence is 

 one important class of speculations, viz. 

 those which refer to the existence of 

 evil. This is a subject which has for ages 

 exercised the human understanding, and 

 still it is regarded as the chief difficulty 

 with which the theist has to contend, 

 We will not attempt to weaken the rea- 

 sonings of Hartley on this point, by laying 1 

 an outline of them before our readers ; 

 but we confidently refer to his ob- 

 servations, as containing the most solid 

 and satisfactory investigations respecting 

 it, and what to all who fully admit his 

 principles of mental philosophy must 

 give views which shew the value of those 



