PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



principles which, from their consistence 

 with the dictates of religion, both derive 

 confirmation and lustre. 



135. Besides these objects of metaphy- 

 sical speculation in connection with the 

 Divine Being 1 , there are some which seem 

 to us to rank with the ancient metaphy- 

 sics; such as, the mode of the divine om- 

 nipresence, the nature of the divine infi- 

 nity, &c. Such things, it may reasonably 

 be supposed, cannot be comprehended by 

 finite beings ; and if so, they cannot be 

 the objects of human science, nor conse- 

 quently of the pursuit of a wise man; but 

 this no more argues against the science 

 of metaphysics, than the absurdity of the 

 pursuit of a perpetual motion against the 

 science of mechanics, or of the search af- 

 ter the philosopher's stone against the 

 study of chemistry. 



136. Secondly, in the extensive sense 

 of the term metaphysics, it comprehends 

 all investigations respecting the opera- 

 tions, powers, and laws of the human 

 mind, (which class under mental philoso- 

 phy,) and respecting the grounds of obli- 

 gation and of human duty, as far as they 

 are derived from the consideration of the 

 mental frame, (which class under moral 

 philosophy.) It appears, however, that 

 the term is more closelv appropriate to 

 those investigations which have for their 

 object subjects connected with the study 

 of the human mind, but which concern 

 rather abstract speculation than practice; 

 for instance, whether the human mind is 

 a distinct, independent substance, or 

 whether the human frame consists of one 

 uniform substance and perception, with 

 its modes, is the result, necessary or 

 otherwise, of the organization of the 

 brain ; whether the human mind is ne- 

 cessarily incorruptible and immortal ; 

 whether there is an external world as the 

 cause of our sensations ; in what per- 

 sonal identity consists; whether power is 

 an attribute of the human mind, he. 



137. Respecting the homogeneity of the 

 human frame, we have already had an 

 opportunity of saying a few words near 

 the beginning of this article : it appears 

 to us a purely metaphysical question, al- 

 most solely of importance in consequence 

 of the frequent misrepresentations (real, 

 though probably unintentional,) of the 

 opinions of those who hold the affirmative 

 side of the question, and of its supposed 

 connection with the natural immortality 

 of the soul. The fact is, that the modern 

 materialists may be considered as having 

 proved, what is admitted by some of the 

 ablest natural philosophers, that solidity, 



and the absence of all active power, are 

 not properties of matter; and while the 

 principle of vitality is on all hands admit- 

 ted as the result, necessary or otherwise, 

 of a certain structure of matter, they see 

 no greater difficulty in the hypothesis that 

 the principle of percipiency is also. Per- 

 haps, if the question had been taken up 

 respecting the lowest of the animal tribes, 

 all of which possess percipiency, and it 

 had first of all been considered whether 

 the phenomena of percipiency in them 

 required the admission of a substance 

 different from that by whose organization 

 the phenomena of vitality in them is pro- 

 duced ; and next, whether there is any 

 essential difference between the perci- 

 piency of the lowest animals, and those 

 which form the gradual ascending links 

 between them and the highest of the 

 brute creation ; and, lastly, whether there 

 is any essential difference between the 

 phenomena of percipiency observable in 

 them, and those in the uncultivated and 

 almost brutal savage; if, above all, all 

 ideas of connection between the immate- 

 riality of the human soul and its natural 

 immortality had been relinquished, the 

 question would have appeared less for- 

 midable, and admitted of an easier deci- 

 sion, 



138. The affirmative of the next ques- 

 tion, respecting the natural immortality 

 of the soul, appears to us to be totally 

 beyond the power of man to prove, from 

 the light of philosophy at least. We have 

 no idea of a substance separate from its 

 properties; and even admitting that the 

 human soul is a distinct substance from 

 the body, what property is it known to 

 possess which necessarily implies inde- 

 structibility ? What proof is there that 

 sensation, memory, intellect, or affection, 

 must necessarily continue, when the sub- 

 stance with which they are at least united, 

 ceases to exist in its organized state ? We 

 do not say that the contrary can be prov- 

 ed ; but we are not metaphysicians 

 enough to discover any arguments for 

 the once common hypothesis, (now, we 

 believe, usually relinquished by philoso- 

 phical immaterialists), which have not 

 been already found inadequate to prove 

 the point. The question seems indeed 

 of very little consequence, except to those 

 who quit the guidance of revelation ; all 

 must depend on the will of the Supreme 

 Being ; and the indications of his will, to 

 be derived from the moral arguments for 

 a fuiure life, and still more from the 

 Christian revelation, are worth a host of 

 reasonings to prove, that a substance of 



