PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



which we can know nothing, excepting 

 its property of percipiency, possesses 

 what cannot follow from percipiency, be- 

 cause we have satisfactory ground to be- 

 lieve, that percipiency is at times totally 

 suspended. 



139. We shall have an opportunity of 

 offering a few remarks on the next of the 

 metaphysical inquiries which we have 

 mentioned, in the article TOUCH, or 

 FEELING, sense of; and we therefore 

 proceed to the following subject, viz. re- 

 specting personal identity. Tin's is a 

 point of considerable importance, since, if 

 the circumstances which constitute per- 

 sonal identity could be shown to be incon- 

 sistent with the infinitely important doc- 

 trine of a future life, it would greatly 

 affect the evidences for that doctrine; 

 but the fact appears to be, that all which 

 true philosophy has to do, is to bring 

 back the airy speculations of some meta- 

 physicians to the level of common sense; 

 to show either that they are unfounded, 

 or that they have no immediate tendency 

 to afiect the belief in a future retribution. 

 That we are through life, and under every 

 change of body and of mind, the same 

 intelligent accountable beings, is a fact 

 which we know by consciousness ; and 

 whether we will or not, we must accept 

 of this evidence. The only question is, 

 what are the circumstances which consti- 

 tute identity of person, amidst all the 

 changes of body and of mind which a man 

 undergoes in the course of a long life ? 

 If any and every hypothesis for the solu- 

 tion of this problem be insufficient, it does 

 not follow that there is no such thing as 

 personal identity ; but merely that such 

 hypothesis is unsatisfactory and untrue. 

 The fact is, that different hypotheses have 

 been advanced on the subject, that per- 

 haps no one of them can be pronounced 

 fully satisfactory, and that some meta- 

 physicians, laying hold of the weak parts 

 of such hypotheses, have actually profess- 

 ed to believe that there is no such thing 

 as personal identity. The conviction, 

 however, of permanent identity is happi- 

 ly too firmly inwrought in the mental 

 system, to allow any thing but an attach- 

 ment to system little short ot insanity to 

 eradicate it. Whether or not we can as- 

 certain in what it consists, the conscious- 

 ness of every individual is a constant and 

 sufficient ground for his admitting the 

 fact ; and if any one should work up his 

 mind to a speculative disbelief of it, while 

 he continues to possess a prospective and 

 retrospective capacity, sensation and men- 

 tal feeling, he cannot, in any considerable 



degree, as far as this life Is concerned, 

 act upon his opinion. The chief impor- 

 tance of such an error respects us con- 

 nection with a future state of retribution, 

 and even here the incredulity of vice alone 

 can, we should suppose, produce in a 

 sane mind any doubt as to the conunuance 

 of identity. The grand point is, will the 

 s\stem of thought and affection to which 

 the word self is applied, be raised again 

 to activity ; and if so, (and no contradic- 

 tion can be urged against the strong evi- 

 dence which we have for it), all is safe as 

 far as respects the sameness of that self. 

 And if to constitute personal identity it 

 should be necessary that more than the 

 same organization of matter be preserved 

 as a vehicle for that system of thought 

 and affection, that even the same system 

 of particles should be preserved. Dr. 

 Watts's hypothesis of permanent stamina, 

 which, if not actually proved, has never 

 been disproved, affords a proof of perso- 

 nal identity in this sense of word, which 

 may satisfy the most scrupulous mate- 

 rialist, and the most captious sceptic. 

 Respecting this subject, we refer our 

 readers to the work from which we have 

 derived several of the foregoing state- 

 ments, viz. "Belsham's Elements of the 

 Philosophy of the Human Mind;" where 

 they will find a luminous view of this dif- 

 ficult subject, and references to the chief 

 writers who have discussed it. They 

 will also find in the same useful work, a 

 view of several other of those discussions 

 which we consider as most strictly meta- 

 physical, with similar references. 



140 The last of those questions which 

 we spoke of in this department of meta- 

 physics is, whether power is an attribute 

 of the human mind. "Power, as an at- 

 tribute of the mind," says Mr. Belsham, 

 "may be defined, the capacity of carry- 

 ing into effect the determinations of the 

 will." Those philosophers who maintain, 

 that it is an attribute of the human mind, 

 argue from consciousness and observa- 

 tion ; and they affirm, that though we can- 

 not define it, we have a notion of it. 

 Those who take the negative side of the 

 question contend, that all we are con- 

 scious of is volition, and the effect pro- 

 duced ; and that what some call a consci- 

 ousness of power, is nothing more than a 

 belief, that the effect will follow the vo- 

 lition, which belief is sometimes errone- 

 ous : they also argue, that our total igno- 

 rance of the manner in which muscular 

 motion is produced, proves that the mind 

 is not the efficient and proper cause of 

 this wonderful effect We are of opi* 



