PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



nion, that it is very much, though not 

 wholly, a dispute about terms. Upon 

 Mr. lielsham's definition of power, we 

 should have supposed, that no difference 

 of opinion could exist, whether it be a 

 property of the rnind ; but they are very 

 different questions, whether the mind 

 possess such capacity in consequence of 

 the ordinations of the Supreme Being, 

 and whether, when exercising this capa- 

 city, it is to be considered as the efficient 

 cause of muscular motions. In this sense, 

 all causation appears to resolve itself into 

 the constant agency of the Deity ; and we 

 see no reason to hesitate in admitting, 

 that all the energies or powers both of 

 body or of mind, are simply modes of his 

 operation. 



141. Some of our readers will proba- 

 bly be disposed to censure us, because 

 we have not ranked the doctrine of ne- 

 cessity, as it is called, among the meta- 

 physical speculations of this class. \V ; 

 are fully aware, that there is an abun- 

 dance of abstruse discussion connected 

 with it ; but in its unencumbered, simple 

 state, the doctrine of motives seems to 

 rank among the practical laws of our 

 frame. At any rate we shall not here 

 enter upon the subject, having already 

 given a short statement of the subject in 

 its proper place : to which, therefore, we 

 beg leave to refer our readers. 



142. Thirdly, metaphysics claims as its 

 own, all inquiries respecting the nature 

 of infinity, motion, duration, space, 8tc. 

 We do not mean to affirm, that these in- 

 quiries are destitute of value, certainly 

 not that they are destitute of interest ; 

 but we cannot, as far as they are distinct 

 from the practical laws of body or mind, 

 attribute any very high importance to 

 them. The speculations of the metaphy- 

 sician respecting duration are among the 

 most important of this class, and with the 

 selection of some remarks on the subject 

 from Belsham's Elements we shall close 

 this article. A succession of sensations 

 and ideas is continually passing through 

 the mind, during the state of vigilance, 

 the knowledge of which we attain by 

 consciousness. The idea of succession is 

 acquired by reflecting upon this train of 

 ideas and sensations, and from no other 

 source. The velocity of the succession 

 of ideas in the same person, is different 

 at different times ; and the variation is 

 sometimes voluntary, and sometimes in- 

 voluntary. The velocity of sensations 

 must always correspond with that of the 

 external impressions: that of ideas de- 



pends very much upon the state of the 

 body : they seem to succeed each other 

 with greater rapidity in the evening than 

 in the morning, in youth than in age, in 

 health than in sickness, in a cheerful 

 frame of mind than when under depres- 

 sion. The course of ideas is in some de- 

 gree obedient to voluntary efforts ; but 

 no effort can retain one in the mind be- 

 yond a very short time, nor can we call 

 up any given number in a given time. 



14o. Duration, as applied to any finite 

 being, signifies continued success 

 istence. The idea of duration is acquir- 

 ed from reflecting upon the succession of 

 our ideas. While this succession conti- 

 nues, we are conscious of the continu- 

 ance of existence ; when it is suspended 

 or forgotten, the consciousness of exist- 

 ence, and the idea of duration, is propor- 

 tionably interrupted. Also, any portion 

 of duration appears longer or shorter, in 

 exact proportion to the number of ideas 

 which are recollected in a given i; 

 While we ourselves continue to exist, we 

 perceive that other beings, whether si- 

 milar or dissimilar to ourselves, also con- 

 tinue to exist: hence we transfer the idea 

 of duration, and even of successive dura- 

 tion, to them, and to all other beings that 

 exist; and duration becomes a measure 

 common to universal existence. Dura- 

 tion is either limited, or unlimited. Li- 

 mited duration is time ; unlimited is 

 eternity. Duration, like space, can only 

 be measured by itself; but it wants an ad- 

 vantage which extension possesses, and 

 which arises from the possibility of apply- 

 ing one portion of it to another. The 

 time that any one idea continues in the 

 view of the mind is an instant; and dur- 

 ing it we are insensible of duration, the 

 very notion of which implies succession. 

 The most natural measure of time, is the 

 number of ideas recollected to have in- 

 tervened between any two given instants; 

 and when all other measures are wanting, 

 this will answer tolerably well. Equable 

 successions really existing, and regularly 

 returning, serve as the most correct mea- 

 sures of time ; such are the revolutions of 

 the heavenly bodies, which being also va- 

 rious, and publicly visible, have been uni- 

 versally adopted, as the most convenient 

 measures of time. These are, ho-, 

 only the measures of duration, and not 

 duration itself, which is the succession of 

 ideas. 



144. If the continued succession of 

 ideas constitute the true duration < ,\ 

 ligent beings snuihr to ours- 



