PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



more than that tliey are going to burn a 

 Jew." 



7. Need we proceed ? is it not a truth 

 indisputable as that \ve are living 1 fur a 

 purpose beyond mere present gratification, 

 " that moral excellence is the true worth 

 and glory of man, and that, therefore, the 

 knowledge of our duty is to every man, 

 in every situation of 'life, the most import- 

 ant of all knowledge ?" Now moral phi- 

 losophy is that science which teaches men 

 their duty, and the reasons of it. We 

 should be happy, if our limits allowed us, 

 to enter minutely into this important sub- 

 ject ; hut we must content ourselves with 

 laying before our readers such a view of 

 those fundamental principles which are 

 derived from the laws of our mental 

 frame, as may furnish a guide and intro- 

 duction to more extensive moral specula- 

 tions, and may serve as a basis on which 

 to found our " rule of life." In doing 

 this, we shall make frequent and free use 

 of the invaluable part of Hartley's obser- 

 vations which bear that title. We do not 

 think it necessary to state where we have 

 him : those who are acquainted, or who 

 may be led, by what we here state, to an 

 acquaintance with his rule of life, will ea- 

 sily perceive what we owe to him ; and to 

 others it would be useless. We also ac- 

 knowledge our obligations to Mr. Bel- 

 sham's " Elements of Moral Philosophy," 

 which, (though we think in one or more 

 of his statements, page 370, he has not 

 enough attended to the power of the dis- 

 interested benevolent affections), we wish 

 to recommend to the perusal of our read- 

 ers. These, with Paley's " Moral Philo- 

 sophy," in connection with Pearson's re- 

 marks and annotations on that work, will, 

 we think, form a pretty complete course 

 of reading on moral science, and will am- 

 ply repay the attention given to them. 



8 The chief questions in morals may 

 be reduced to three. What is that quality 

 of conduct, affections, or character, which 

 render them obligatory upon a reasonable 

 being constituted like man ? What are 

 those affections, conduct, and character, 

 which possess this quality ? What are the 

 best means for the performance of that 

 conduct, and the acquisition of those af- 

 fections and that character? The first of 

 these we shall now proceed to consider. 



JMbral Obligation. The Criterion of 

 Virtue. 



? 



9. The term obligation respects volun- 

 tary actions only. *We say, we are oblig- 

 ed to walk if we wish to have health : we 



are obliged to regular exertion if we wish 

 to acquire valuable mental habits ;.we are 

 obliged to perform certain fictions in order 

 to attain certain ends. The use of the 

 term in this and similar situations, sug- 

 gests its true import. Obligation ex- 

 presses the necessary connection existing 

 between a certain end and a certain 

 means. Thus, if that end be the posses- 

 sion of health, the necessary means are, 

 that we take exerci-e : if the end be the 

 formation of valuable mental habits, a re- 

 gular series of exertions is the necessary 

 means ; and, in short, in whatever case 

 we wish to express that certain ends can 

 only be obtained by certain means, we 

 say we are obliged to use these means, in 

 order to obtain these ends. 



10. Obligation differs from compulsion. 

 The former respects voluntary actions, 

 the latter involuntary. Compulsion al- 

 ways implies some external force. Thus, 

 a man is obliged in honour to pay his 

 debts, and if he do not he will be com- 

 pelled by the law ; that is, if to satisfy the 

 calls of honour be the end, the payment of 

 Ins debts is the necessary means ; if this 

 obligation operate not sufficiently strongly 

 as a motive, he will be compelled to do it 

 against his will, by the law. 



11. Obligation by no means implies an 

 obliger. 1 may be obliged by reason, by 

 interest, by convenience, by honour, by 

 conscience, &c. as well as by the aulhori. 

 ty of another. Authority is one, but not 

 the only source of obligation. 



12. Moral obligation respects those ac- 

 tions which are denominated virtuous or 

 vicious ; we are obliged to perform the 

 one, and to abstain from the other, be- 

 cause this is the necessary means, in or- 

 der to effect a certain end, or certain ends. 

 That is to say, unless we do practise vir- 

 tue, and abstain from vice, we cannot ob- 

 tain the end which wisdom points out as 

 deserving pursuit. 



13. As has been remarked of obligation 

 in general, there may be various sources 

 of moral obligation ; that is, a person may 

 be obliged to the performance of his duty 

 by the laws of God, the dictates of his 

 conscience, the hopes and fears of immor- 

 tality. Whatever can be pointed out as 

 the ultimate obligation, that is, that to 

 which all others may be reduced, will also 

 furnish the most general criteripn of duty. 

 Thus, if it appear that the ultimate obli- 

 gation to virtue is the greatest happiness 

 of the agent, then we should say, that yir- 

 tue is that quality of an action, or affec- 

 tion, or character, by which it tends to 

 the greatest happiness of the agent. In 



