PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



other words, a certain character of action 

 or disposition is a- necessary mean to a 

 certain end ; that end may be various : 

 suppose the ultimate end, or that to which 

 all others are to be referred, is the great- 

 est happiness of the agent, then it follows, 

 that the tendency to the greatest happi- 

 ness of the agent is that criterion by 

 which we are to ascertain whether or not 

 it is obligatory. To such a tendency we 

 give the denomination of virtue. 



14. Many sources of obligation have 

 been pointed out by different philoso- 

 phers. That is, to the question, Why 

 ought I to act in a certain way which we 

 call virtuously ? many answers have been 

 given. Some of the most important are 

 the following, 



15. It is agreeable, say some, to the 

 eternal and necessary fitness of things. 

 This leaves the distinction between vir- 

 tue and vice altogether arbitrary ; for it 

 depends upon the perception of a fitness 

 or unfitness, which can only be ascertain- 

 ed by investigations, whose conclusions 

 will differ in different individuals. Be- 

 sides, it has justly been asked, What are 

 those moral fitnesses fit for ? If the fitness 

 or unfitness of actions means any thing 

 different from their tendency to produce 

 happiness or misery, the expression is 

 unintelligible. We may safely use the 

 expression, for there is certainly a beau- 

 ty and propriety in virtue, which increas- 

 es in our estimation as virtue itself gains 

 an influence in our breasts ; but still, 

 when we speak of it as an obligation, 

 we find the question returning, Why 

 ought I to act agreeably to the fitness of 

 things ? 



16. It is agreeable, say others, to the 

 dictates of right reason. Unless you can 

 show me a reason, independently of your 

 assertion, in what way am I bound to 

 comply with what you call the rules of 

 virtue ? Besides, in what respect can an 

 action be said to be agreeable to the dic- 

 tates of right reason, but as it possesses 

 some tendency to something? and what 

 that something is, it leaves us to estimate 

 for ourselves, and consequently does not 

 bring us to the ultimate obligation which 

 we are inquiring for. 



17. It is the opinion of some, whose 

 own confirmed habits of virtue probably 

 were in some measure the cause of the 

 opinion, that virtue carries in itself its 

 own obligation; that the understanding 

 represents a certain action, or set of ac- 

 tions, as right, and that therefore it ought 

 to be performed. It is objected, with 

 great justice to this system, that it leaves 



the matter where it found i{ ; for the 

 question recurs, Why am I obliged to 

 perform an action which my unde 

 ing represents to me as right? Further, it 

 is arguing in a circle. My understanding- 

 represents such an action as right; that 

 is, obligatory ; and therefore I am oblig- 

 ed to perform it. Why does my under- 

 standing represent this action as right 

 Besides, it refers to a kind of infallable 

 judge within, whose dictates appear, in 

 fact, to be very different in different per- 

 sons. Felton believed that he did what 

 was right, that, in short, he performed 

 an action which was highly meritorious, 

 when he murdered the duke of Bucking- 

 ham. According to this, he was under 

 an obligation to do it. There cannot be 

 a doubt that it is the part of true wisdom 

 to endeavour to cultivate the moral pow- 

 ers, and then leave the actions entirely 

 (except in extreme cases) to their sug- 

 gestions. Bat to state, that an action is 

 obligatory, because the understanding, 

 or the conscience, (for it comes to the 

 same thing) represents it as right, is to 

 sanction as virtuous, some of the most 

 depraved actions : some of the most 

 depraved actions have been performed 

 by those who thought it right to perform 

 them. The fact appears to be, that the 

 advocates for this system, having spent 

 much of their lives in cultivating their 

 moral ideas, and finding them always cor- 

 rect, have acquired the habit of acting 

 implicitly upon them, and hence have 

 judged, that becaus they were represent- 

 ed by our conscience as right, therefore 

 they were obligatory. This appears a 

 sufficient obligation for those who have 

 well-cultivated consciences; but it will 

 answer in no other cases, and the ques- 

 tion still recurs, Why is this action ob- 

 ligatory ? 



18. Because, say others, it is agreeable 

 to the dictates of the conscience. The 

 observations under the last head have an- 

 ticipated what might be made here. 

 When we analyze the grounds of the 

 moral feelings and sentiments, (See PHI- 

 LOSOPHY, mental), we shall see, that 

 they cannot be safely made the infalli- 

 ble rule of our conduct, still less can they 

 furnish the ground of obligation. It can- 

 not, however, be too strongly impressed 

 upon the mind, that correct dictates, 

 and the exaction of implicit obedience to 

 those dictates, constitute the perfection 

 of the conscience. 



19. But when we say it is agreeable to 

 the will of God, we seem incapable of ad- 

 vancing further. We surely are obliged 



