PHILOSOPHY, MORAL, 



from the fact, that inordinate indulg&nce 

 in sensual gratifications destroys the 

 mental faculties, exposes to external in- 

 conveniencies and pains, is totally incon- 

 sistent with the duties and pleasures of 

 benevolence and piety, and is all along 

 attended with the secret reproaches of 

 the moral sense, and the horrors of a 

 guilty mind. Such is the constitution of 

 our mental frame, that the formation of 

 mental feelings and affections cannot be 

 altogether prevented ; but that an in- 

 ordinate pursuit of sensible pleasures 

 converts the mental affections into a 

 source of pain, and impairs and cuts off 

 the intellectual pleasures. 



24. The same thing may be concluded 

 from the fact, that the sensible plea- 

 sures are formed first, and the mental 

 pleasures from them, by the associative 

 power. Now it is a general principle in 

 the order of nature, that the prior state 

 or means is less perfect and important 

 than the posterior state or the means. 

 Hence the sensible pleasures cannot be 

 of equal value and dignity with the men- 

 tal, to the generation of which they are 

 made subservient. This inference may 

 be drawn from the analogy of nature, 

 without reference to the inlinite benevo- 

 lence of the Supreme Being, which, 

 however, makes it more satisfactory. 



25. Further, the mental pleasures are 

 more consistent with the gentle, gradual 

 decay of the body, than the sensible plea- 

 sures, because, as they are formed from 

 the combination and coalescence of many 

 sensible pleasures, they more affect the 

 sensible system at large ; while the sen- 

 sible pleasures principally affect the par- 

 ticular parts of the system to which they 

 belong, and therefore, when indulged to 

 excess, they injure or destroy their re- 

 spective organs before the whole body 

 comes to a period. 



26. Lastly, the duration of mere sensi- 

 ble pleasure is necessarily very short, 

 and cannot, even when free from guilt, 

 afford any pleasing recollections; whereas 

 one of the principal tendencies of our 

 nature is, and must be, the pleasures of 

 reflection and consciousness. In like 

 manner, the evident use and restriction 

 of one of the chief sensible pleasures to 

 preserve life and health, with all the con- 

 sequent mental faculties and executive 

 bodily powers ; of the other to continue 

 the species, and to generate and enlarge 

 benevolence, makes the subordinate 

 nature of both manifest in an obvious 

 way. 



BEGtJLATIOX OF THE TUKSUIT OF ftESTSIBLTS 

 PLEASURES. 



27. The foregoing remarks prove, that 

 the pleasures of sensation ought not to 

 be made the primary pursuit of life, but 

 requife to be regulated and restrained 

 by some foreign regulating power. That 

 they should be submitted to the precepts 

 of benevolence, piety, and the moral 

 sense, may be proved", by shewing that 

 by this means they will contribute both 

 to their own improvement, and to that of 

 other parts ot our natures. Now bene- 

 volence requires, that the pleasures of 

 sense should be made entirely subservi- 

 ent to health of body and of mind, so 

 that each person may best fill his place 

 in life; best perform the several relative 

 duties of it ; and, as far as in him lies, 

 prolong his days to their utmost period 

 free from great diseases and infirmities. 

 All gratifications, therefore, which tend 

 to produce diseases of body, or irregu- 

 larities of mind, are forbidden by be- 

 nevolence, and the most wholesome diet 

 as to quantity and quality enjoined by it. 

 It also most strictly forbids all gratifi- 

 cations by which the health or virtue of 

 other individuals is injured, or by which 

 encouragement is given to others to de- 

 part from the rules of chastity and tem- 

 perance. The precepts of piety are to 

 the same purpose, whether they are de- 

 duced from our relation to God, as our 

 common father and benefactor, who wills 

 that all his children should use his 

 blessings so as to promote the common 

 good; or from the natural manifestations 

 of his will, in the immediate pleasures 

 and advantages arising from moderate re- 

 freshment, and the manifest inconveni- 

 encies and injuries caused by excess in 

 quantity or quality ; or from his revealed 

 will, by which temperance in all sensible 

 pleasures is commanded, and intempe- 

 rance severely threatened. In like man- 

 ner the moral sense directs implicitly to 

 the same moderation, whether it be 

 derived explicitly from the foregoing 

 rules of benevolence and piety, or from 

 ideas of decency, rational self-interest, 

 the practice of wise and good men, the 

 disgusting nature of the diseases conse- 

 quent on intemperance, the odiousness 

 and mischief of violent passions, &c. It 

 is evident, therefore, that all these guides 

 of life lead to the same end, viz. great 

 moderation in sensible enjoyments, 

 though they differ somewhat* in their 

 motives, and in the commodiousness of 

 their application, as a rule in the particu- 

 lar occurrences of life. 



