PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



those whose superiority over them is very 

 great. In fine, then and then only is sci- 

 ence a worthy object of pursuit, as a pri- 

 mary object, when it is pursued with just 

 views ; when it is valued for its tendency 

 to form valuable mental habits, and to 

 cultivate moral ones ; when we appreci- 

 ate its value by its enlarging our capacity 

 pf usefulness to our fellow-men, and by 

 its enabling- us to raise our minds from 

 sense to intellect ; when we make it the 

 path to religious and moral worth. As a 

 means, it is highly conducive to the puri- 

 fication and perfection of our nature ; pur- 

 sued as an end, it will engross the affec- 

 tions, and the more noble and fascinating, 

 than the sordid or sensible pleasures, will 

 by degrees become a more dangerous and 

 obstinate evil than those. 



III. ESTIMATE OF THE PLEASURES 

 OF AMBITION. 



(PHILOSOPHY, mefital, 75 78.) 



39. That the pleasures of honour ought 

 not to be made a primary object of pur- 

 suit, appears from the following consi- 

 derations. An eager desire of the plea- 

 sures of honour, and an earnest endeavour 

 to obtain them, has a manifest tendency 

 to disappoint itself. The merit of actions, 

 that is, that property for which they are 

 extolled, and the agent loved or esteem- 

 ed, is that they proceed from benevolence, 

 r some other moral or religious consi- 

 deration : whereas, it the desire of praise 

 form any considerable part of the motive, 

 we censure rather than commend. But 

 if praise be supposed the greatest good, 

 the desire of it will prevail over other de- 

 sires, and vanity, self-conceit, and pride, 

 qualities which all regard as contempti- 

 ble, will be the necessary consequents. 

 Again, if praise be considered as the su- 

 preme good of the species, what is there 

 which shall be selected as the greatest sub- 

 ject of encomium. What is there which shall 

 be the universal object of praise, as well 

 as within the reach of every one. Exter- 

 nal advantages, riches, beauty, strength, 

 &c. These are neither in the power of 

 all, nor universally commended. Great 

 talents, wit, sagacity, invention ; these, 

 though more the subjects of encomium, 

 fall to the lot of very tew only. In short, 

 virtue alone is both universally esteemed, 

 and in the power of all who are sufficient- 

 ly desirous to attain it. But virtue cannot 

 consist with the pursuit of praise, much 

 less with its being made a primary object. 

 Hence it ought not to be made such. 



Even those who possess the advantages 

 which are made the subject of praise, can 

 seldom pursue praise with success. Praise 

 cannot be the lot of many, because it sup- 

 poses something extraordinary in the 

 thing praised ; so that he who pursues it 

 must either have a very good opinion of 

 himself, which is a dangerous quality in 

 the seeker of praise, or allow that there 

 are many chances against him. The 

 same conclusion is drawn, it we consider 

 the progress of the pleasures of honour. 

 Children are pleased with encomiums 

 upon any advantageous circumstances 

 which relate to them, but this wears off 

 by degrees ; and as we advance in life, we 

 learn more and more to confine our plea- 

 sures of this kind to things within our 

 own power, and to virtue. In like man- 

 ner, the judicious part ot mankind, that is, 

 those whose praise is most valued, give it 

 only to virtue, and those feelings and ha- 

 bits of which virtue is the basis. Here 

 again is a manifest subserviency of these 

 pleasures to virtue : they not only tell us, 

 that they are not our ultimate end, but 

 show us what is. 



40. There is something extremely ab- 

 surd and ridiculous in supposing a person 

 to be perpetually feasting his mind with 

 the praises that already are, or which he 

 hopes will be hereafter given to him. And 

 yet, unless a man does this, which besides 

 would incapacitate him for deserving or 

 obtaining praise, how can he fill up a thou- 

 sandth part of his time with the pleasures 

 of ambition. Further, men who are much 

 commended are apt to think themselves 

 above the level of the rest of the world, 

 and it is evident, that praise from inferiors 

 wants much of the high relish those expect 

 who make praise an object : it is even un- 

 easy and painful to a man to hear himself 

 commended, though he may think it his 

 due, by a person whom he does not think 

 qualified to judge. And in this view of 

 things, a mind which has acquired truly 

 philosophical and religious notions, sees 

 immediately that all the praises of man- 

 kind are comparatively of no value, be- 

 cause no man can be a thoroughly com- 

 petent judge of the actions and motives 

 of others. Lastly, the desire of praise car- 

 ries us from less to greater circles of ap- 

 plauders, at greater distances of time and 

 place; hence it necessarily inspires us 

 with an eager hope of a future life Now, 

 all reflections upon a future life, the new 

 scenes which will be unfolded there, the 

 discoveries which will then be made of 

 the secrets of all hearts, must cast a damp 

 upon every ambition, except a virtuous 



