PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



one, and produce diffidence even in those 

 who have the best testimony of their con- 

 science. 



Regulation of the Pleasures of Honour. 



41. We have already seen sufficient 

 ground for the position, that it is a law 

 of our natures, that the inferior sources 

 of happiness are most productive of hap- 

 piness when not made the primary ob- 

 jects of pursuit, but submit to the direc- 

 tion of the higher means. This is 

 eminently the case with respect to the 

 pleasures of honour. They may un- 

 doubtedly be obtained in their highest 

 degree, and in their greatest perfection, 

 by paying a strict regard to the precepts 

 of benevolence, piety, and the moral 

 senses. These precepts lead to the at- 

 tainment of those qualities, and the per- 

 formance of those actions, whose value 

 is universally felt, and universally admit- 

 ted ; and at the same time preserve from 

 that ostentatious display of them, or of 

 other supposed grounds of honour, which 

 would render their possessor ridiculous 

 or contemptible. Honour is certainly af- 

 fixed by the bulk of mankind to actions 

 of benevolence, such as acts of genero- 

 sity, compassion, public spirit, &c., and 

 the encomiums bestowed upon such ac- 

 tions are one principal source of the feel- 

 ings of the moral sense. The maximum 

 of honour, therefore, must coincide with 

 benevolence and the moral sense, and 

 consequently with piety also, which is 

 closely connected with them. It must, 

 however, be admitted, that direct acts of 

 piety are by no means calculated to gain 

 the honour of the world in general, but, 

 on the contrary, they expose to the re- 

 proach of enthusiasm, superstition, &c.; 

 on the other hand, however, it must 

 also be admitted, that humility, which is 

 the principal of all the qualifications 

 which recommend men to the world, 

 cannot be obtained in any high degree 

 without piety. Hence piety directly leads 

 to the honour of men, and at the same 

 time, in proportion as piety increases in 

 its efficacy on the mind, the fear of this 

 censure gradually diminishes. 



42. The grand source of honour, di- 

 rectly or indirectly, is the tendency of an 

 action or disposition to happiness of 

 some kind or other, occurring to a man's 

 self, or to the world, by his means. He, 

 therefore, who is most happy in himself, 

 and contributes most to the happiness of 

 others, must in the end, from the very 



law of our natures, have the greatest 

 quantity of honourable associations con- 

 ferred upon him. But it has already ap- 

 peared, in part, that benevolence, piety, 

 and the moral sense, are the only true 

 lasting sources of private happiness. ; and 

 that the greatest public happiness arises 

 from them cannot be doubted by any 

 one ; hence he in whom these qualities 

 are prevalent, will, as far as his character 

 is known and understood, obtain the ap- 

 plause of all, both good and bad. The 

 esteem of the good he will first obtain, 

 because they can most easily estimate his 

 worth ; and it is this alone which is va- 

 luable and useful in exciting to honoura- 

 ble attainments. 



43. In proportion as the views extend, 

 and the comprehension of the mind in- 

 creases, the desire of honour, esteem, 

 and approbation, will require higher 

 sources of gratification than that of men, 

 even of the wise and good : it rises even 

 to the throne of the Most High, and from 

 him to whom all hearts are open humbly 

 hopes for approbation. This greatest of 

 all honours can undeniably be obtained 

 only by a regard to piety, benevolence, 

 and the moral sense. If the desire of it 

 be not the desire of our minds, it must 

 arise from such inattention to the most 

 important relations in which we stand, as 

 is totally inconsistent with our true hap- 

 piness ; and if it become a ruling prin- 

 ciple of our minds, all encomiums will 

 derive their value from their consistency 

 with the highest standard of honour. 



On the Effects of Pride and Vanity. 



44. Before we offer any remarks on 

 this point, it may be requisite that we ex- 

 plain in what manner we use our terms, 

 since they are employed with great lati- 

 tude, so as to throw discredit upon ethi- 

 cal representations respecting pride and 

 vanity : and since by the transference of 

 the association connected with what is 

 called laudable pride, to a quality of the 

 mind which in every shape of it is a vice, 

 that abhorrence of it is diminished, which 

 its obvious ill consequences should al- 

 ways produce. By pride, we understand 

 an unjust feeling of superiority over 

 others, or of elevation in the scale by 

 which the individual estimates honour ; 

 by vanity, an excessive desire of the 

 praise or good opinion of others. The 

 former indicates an unfounded opinion as 

 to the title to honour : the latter is gene- 

 rally accompanied with some opinion of 



