PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



suggestion that would occur to their 

 minds, that they had mistaken their due. 

 But in those whose pride is less confirm- 

 ed, or whose minds are more dependent, 

 that pride leads to vanity. Their own 

 high ideas of their own powers and at- 

 tainments, require the. sympathy of others 

 to render them steady. Precisely as 

 pride or vanity has the predominance, 

 the want of such gratification will lead to 

 greater independence, or greater sub- 

 mission ; in the one case leaving the mind 

 to the wayward wanderings of its own 

 feelings, in the other forging more firmly 

 the shackles which bind it to the world. 

 Happy they who have learnt from various 

 discipline, that higher approbation is to 

 be sought for than the approbation of the 

 world, or even than their own, and that 

 neither possesses permanent value, ex- 

 cept where sanctioned by that which, 

 when once the ruling object of the mind, 

 will make all others comparatively insig- 

 nificant. 



48. We have stated that both pride 

 and vanity may exist independently of 

 each other : from what we have advanc- 

 ed it appears, that pride will exist thus 

 separately only in a vigorous mind, vani- 

 ty, we would add, will be- found inde- 

 pendently of pride only in a weak mind. 

 He who cannot rest satisfied without the 

 sympathy of others, must be ever varying 

 in his ideas, and fickle in his conduct. 

 Without it he will possess no firmness, 

 and with it no decision. The approba- 

 tion which pride claims as its due, vanity 

 seeks as a favour : if it receive it not, the 

 vain mind desponds, for it has not learn- 

 ed to trust in itself. 



49. It is difficult to form a comparative 

 estimate of the injurious effects of pride 

 and vanity. When the soil is good, both 

 may produce good fruit : perhaps, how- 

 ever,' pride 1 presents the most effectual 

 obstacles to improvement, and vanity 

 tends most to render that improvement 

 ineffectual. Tn the early periods of life 

 the good opinion of others is the highest 

 stimulus which the mind can receive, 

 and, well directed, it has its full effect in 

 prompting to the attainment of moral and 

 mental excellence. The circle at first is 

 narrow : the few friends on whom we de- 

 pend for the various comforts and enjoy- 

 ments of life, are those, whose good opi. 

 nion forms our first object. If these are, 

 fortunately for us, correct in their appre- 

 ciation of worth, their good opinion is the 

 source of future excellence, it prompts to 

 the formation of the most valuable habits, 

 and lavs the foundation for that desire of 



honour, which afterwards raises the mind 

 to Him whose approbation is happiness. 

 If they make their approbation depend 

 upon right conduct, and do not lavish 

 their praise or their censure, but give it 

 only where justly estimated praise or 

 censure is due, the result is valuable ; if 

 they teach to value the praise of the wise 

 and the good only, vanity will in time be 

 brought within proper limits ; but they do 

 not do all, if they do not teach that" the 

 pleasure which they at present receive 

 from their friends is afterwards to be 

 chiefly sought for in that of their best 

 friend, that his approbation is to be made 

 the criterion of excellence, and that by 

 this they must appreciate the worth of 

 all other sources of honour. If indiscrimi- 

 nate vanity be not thus checked,the mind 

 which seeks the good opinion of others 

 will fall into the opinions and practices 

 of others ; unsteadiness of principle and 

 of conduct must be expected, for that on 

 which they are founded is variable as the 

 wind. The stimulus of praise becomes 

 necessary to happiness ; and the mind is 

 incapable of exertion where that praise is 

 not to be obtained ; is incapable of acting 

 in opposition to the opinion of those 

 whose censures it deems the worst of 

 evils, whose praise it regards as the chief 

 of goods. The excessive desire of the 

 good opinion even of the wise and good, 

 is injurious to the mind. It enervates its 

 powers of action, it renders it fickle and 

 inconstant : it prevents from efforts lead- 

 ing to high utility, where those efforts 

 may be misinterpreted : it checks the at- 

 tention which should be paid to superior 

 honour : and it prevents that ardent de- 

 sire for the highest approbation, which 

 should be made, as far as possible, the 

 primary object of pursuit. 



50. The virtue of humility is the most 

 difficult to acquire of all the train, yet it 

 is this which gives the true grace to the 

 character. It is the characteristic of Chris- 

 tianity, and it is in this respect that the 

 Christian so far excels the stoical system 

 of morality : the whole structure of the 

 latter was laid upon the foundation of hu- 

 man pride, and though frequently capti- 

 vating to the imagination, which loves to 

 view the elevated mind, yet it often af- 

 fords a poor shelter to the children of hu- 

 manity. Humility does not direct us to 

 estimate ourselves lower than impartiali- 

 ty requires ; but it is seldom that we need 

 fear wandering into this extreme, except 

 where it arises from that self-diffidence, 

 which distrusts, merely because vanity has 

 not yet lent its support. This excess of 



