PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



and dangers, and therefore not to be 

 trodden without tear, and care, and per- 

 plexity. The happy man, therefore, is 

 not he whose happiness is his only cure ; 

 but he who with perfect resignation 

 leaves the care of his happiness to his 

 Maker, while he pursues with ardour the 

 road of his duty. This gives an elevation 

 to his mind which is teal happiness; in- 

 stead of care, and fear, and anxiety, and 

 disappointment, it brings peace and joy. 

 It gives a relish to every good we enjoy ; 

 it smoothes the brow of distress, cairns 

 the perturbed mind, and makes the pil- 

 low of suffering and of death the rest of 

 happinesss, 



T. ESTIMATE OP THE PLEASURES OF SYM- 

 PATHY. 



(PUILOSOPHT, mental, 85 88.) 



61. We have now proceeded through 

 rind examined all those sources of happi- 

 ness which do not coincide with what we 

 rsiublished as the standard of comparison, 

 the greatest ultimate happiness. We have 

 seen, that if any of them be made the 

 primary object of pursuit, happiness can- 

 not be obtained ; and that the greatest 

 degrees of these pleasures are to be ob- 

 tained, not by making them our primary 

 object, but submitting ourselves to the 

 guidance of benevolence and piety. We 

 might hence alone be inclined to consi- 

 der the inference a just one, that the af- 

 fections of benevolence and piety, and 

 those actions to which they prompt, 

 should be made by us our primary ob- 

 ject. We shall feel our ground more 

 sure when we enter into the positive ar- 

 gument for these premises ; and we now 

 proceed to ascertain what rank the bene- 

 volent affections should have in our rule 

 of life. And here it is to be laid down 

 as a principle, that the cultivation of 

 these affections should be made a pri- 

 mary object of the pursuit for the follow- 

 ing reasons. 



62. Benevolence improves the inferior 

 pleasures, by limiting and regulating 

 them, as we have already seen in the 

 course of our former investigations. 

 Again, the pleasures of benevolence unite 

 and coincide with those of piety and the 

 moral sense. That benevolence unites 

 with piety is obvious ; for by the love of 

 the good we are led to love the source 

 of goodness ; and back again from the 

 love of God to the love of all that 

 he has made. The pleasures of be- 

 Devolence are one principal source of 



the moral sense, and the moral sense 

 in its turn improves and enforces them 

 entirely. 



63. The pleasures of benevolence are 

 unlimited in their extent. In order to 

 shew that the pleasures of sensation did 

 not deserve our primary attention, an ex- 

 treme case was taken of a person who 

 actually made them his primary object: 

 in the same way suppose a person to take 

 all opportunities of gratifying his benevo- 

 lent desires, making it his study, plea- 

 sure, and constant employment, either to 

 promote happiness, or to lessen misery. 

 Now it is very obvious, that he would 

 have a very large field for exercise, no 

 less than the whole round of domestic and 

 social relations. And if his benevolence 

 were pure, and regulated by the dictates 

 of piety and the conscience, he might, in 

 general, expect success: And from the 

 experience of those who have made the 

 trial, it does not appear that the relish for 

 its pleasures languishes, as in other cases, 

 but gains strength by gratification ; and 

 they continue to please in reflection. 

 The reason of this is obvious from the 

 law of association ; for since they are in 

 general attended with success, and are 

 consistent with and productive of the se- 

 veral inferior pleasures in their due de- 

 gree, and are also further increased by 

 the moral and religious pleasures, they 

 receive fresh addition upon every grati- 

 fication, and therefore increase perpe- 

 tually, when the affections are cultivated 

 as they ought to be. 



64. The pleasures of benevolence are 

 self-consistent. All may share them with- 

 out diminishing their mutual happiness. 

 Harmony and mutual co-operation pre- 

 vail among the benevolent ; and benevo- 

 lent actions have a tendency to excite 

 correspondent actions indefinitely. By 

 degrees, when benevolence has arrived 

 at its due height, all the sensibilities of 

 the individual for himself will be more or 

 less transferred upon others, by his be- 

 nevolence and compassion for them. And 

 in like manner, when our moral sense is 

 sufficiently established and improved, and 

 we are capable of being influenced to 

 perform what is fit and right, by the con- 

 sideration that it is so, our imperfect sen- 

 sibility for others tends to diminish, by 

 being compared with it, our exorbitant 

 attachment to ourselves ; at the same 

 time that compassion takes off our 

 thoughts from ourselves. And thus be- 

 nevolence to a single person may ulti- 

 mately become equal to self-interest, by 

 this tendency of self-interest to increase 



