PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



benevolence, and reciprocally of bene- 

 volence to lessen self-interest, though 

 originally self-interest was indefinitely 

 greater than benevolence ; and thus we 

 may learn to be as much concerned for 

 others as for ourselves, and as little con- 

 cerned for ourselves as for others. It is 

 not often that benevolence is thus height- 

 ened : perhaps in the strictest sense it 

 can never reach this height in the pre- 

 sent state ; but take the case where there 

 is a decided preponderance of benevo- 

 lence over every feeling which bears the 

 character of malevolent. It is not per- 

 haps capable of proof, but certainly has 

 decided probability, that in the circle in 

 which each moves, and in the circle of 

 the race at large, happiness decidedly 

 preponderates. If the benevolent indi- 

 vidual, though he do not see this balance 

 of happiness clearly, yet has some com- 

 fortable general knowledge if it, he must 

 be a greater gainer in the whole by his 

 benevolence, because thus he has a source 

 of constant gratification in the perception 

 of such a preponderance of happiness 

 among 1 those in whose happiness he has 

 learned to rejoice in some measure as in 

 his own. 



65. It will confirm our belief that the 

 cultivation of benevolence should be made 

 a primary pursuit of life, if we recollect 

 that its pleasures lie open to all kinds and 

 degrees of men, since every man has it in 

 his power to benefit others, and since we 

 all stand in need of each other's good offi- 

 ces. Unlike the brute creation, we are 

 dependent upon each other from the era* 

 die to the grave, for life, for health, for 

 convenience, for pleasure, for intellectual 

 accomplishments, and are unable to sub- 

 sist with comfort singly, or even in very 

 small societies ; and this may be consi- 

 dered as a mark of the superior excellence 

 of man's social pleasures. All the ten- 

 dencies of the events of life, ordinary and 

 extraordinary, of the relations of life, of 

 the various pleasures which have been 

 enumerated, to connect us together, to 

 connect accidental associations, and those 

 forced upon us by the common situation 

 of man, and his situation in society, into 

 permanent affections, prove the same 

 thing ; so great, indeed, is this tendency, 

 that two men without claims to the title 

 of benevolent, can scarcely become fami- 

 liarly known to each other, without con- 

 ceiving some good-will, complaisance, 

 compassion, and tenderness, for each 

 other. Further, we love, esteem, and as- 

 sist the benevolent more than others : so 

 that a benevolent action not only excites 



the receiver to a grakful return, but also 

 the by-stander to approve and reward : 

 and benevolence receives a hundred-fold^ 

 even in this world. " !?ut," says the ex- 

 cellent Hartley, " it would be endless to 

 pursue this. Benevolence is, indeed, the 

 grand design and purport of human life, 

 of this probationary state; and every cir- 

 cumstance of human life, duly considered, 

 must and does point to it directly or in- 

 directly." 



66. As it is now established that bene- 

 volence is a primary pursuit, it follows, 

 that all the pleasures of malevolence are 

 excluded, as direct obstacles to our hap- 

 piness. The lower pleasures may all be 

 made consistent with, and even subservi- 

 ent to, benevolence, by the limitations and 

 power of it : but those of malevolence are 

 quite incompatible with it. As far as 

 malevolence is allowed, benevolence must 

 be destroyed. There is, however, this 

 exception ; where wishing evil to some 

 disposes us to be more benevolent on the 

 whole, (as in the case of what is called a 

 just indignation against the vicious), it 

 may somewhat aid the moral progress in 

 the lower stages of benevolence. But it 

 is exceedingly dangerous to encourage 

 such a disposition of mind, by satire, in- 

 vective, or dispute, however unworthy 

 the opponent may be ; for, fostered, it will 

 soon wear the features of ill-will, will soon 

 totally become rank malevolence. 



67. We must not only forego the plea, 

 sures of malevolence, but patiently and re- 

 solutely endure the pains of benevolence, 

 particularly those of compassion. But we 

 shall not be losers on either of these ac- 

 counts. The pleasures of the moral sense, 

 which result from these virtues, will, in 

 the first case, compensate for what we 

 forego ; in the last, overbalance what we 

 endure. Besides, mercy and forgiveness 

 are in themselves pleasures, and in the 

 event productive of many others ; and 

 compassion generally leads us to such 

 conduct as makes the afflicted to rejoice, 

 and increases our disposition to rejoice 

 with them. 



68. As benevolence is thus supported 

 by many direct arguments, there are many 

 similar and apposite arguments to prove 

 that malevolence is the bane of human 

 happiness; that it occasions misery to the 

 agent as well as the sufferer; that it is in- 

 definitely inconsistent with itself, and with 

 the course of nature; and that, conse- 

 quently, it is impossible that it should 

 subsist for ever. Now all these become 

 so many indirect arguments for benevo- 



