PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



belief, in the beneficial tendency of the in- 

 dividual action, should be considered as 

 less founded ; we should perhaps in all 

 cases, certainly in most, unhesitatingly 

 sacrifice much private advantage, and 

 even the apparent good of others, to con- 

 sistency in our adherence to what on the 

 whole must be best. We may indeed 

 think that the consequences which would 

 arise from the general adoption of our in- 

 dividual conduct, ought not to be attribu- 

 ted in any way to us ; but we should re- 

 collect that if we once break down the 

 barrier, however small the breach, the ad- 

 vantage gained by the enemy is evident. 

 In fact, when once we remove the limits 

 which reason and revelation fix, we usurp 

 to ourselves the privilege of the Almigh- 

 ty, and cannot fail to prove our own 

 weakness. It is on this ground, and with 

 great justice, that Puley considers crimes 

 as deriving their criminality, not so much 

 from the consequences of the individual 

 action, as from the consequences which 

 would result from such actions becoming 

 general. Thus the man, who by the for- 

 gery of a one pound note, may probably 

 render no individual injury worth esli- 

 m'ating'in the punishment of a fellow crea- 

 ture ; and another, who by the forgery of 

 a large bill, without direct intention, ruins 

 an individual family, are both equally cul- 

 pable in the eye of reason, and perhaps as 

 far as punishment is beneficial to others, 

 he who has forged the one pound note 

 deserves greater severity of punishment, 

 because the means of committing his de- 

 predation on society are much more prac- 

 ticable than in the other case. But in 

 both it is not the individual injury sus- 

 tained that is to regulate the proportion 

 of demerit, but the consequences which 

 would follow the total destruction of com- 

 mercial intercourse and of mutual confi- 

 dence. 



76. By the application of this important 

 principle, much of that obscurity is dissi- 

 pated, which seems to involve some ques- 

 tions on morals which are intimately con- 

 nected with the well being of society. 

 Many of those violations of veracity, for 

 instance, which even benevolence seems 

 to authorise, will appear to be direct de- 

 viations from the soundest principles of 

 morality, and consequently to be unau- 

 thorised by benevolence, when viewed in 

 their fair extent, however much the im- 

 mediate consequences may seem to de- 

 mand them. There is, however, one re- 

 striction to this rule, which seems to be 

 necessary, in order ^to enable us fully to 

 submit to its influence. It is, whether the 



probability of our conduct being genera} 

 ly adopted, be sufficient to counterba- 

 lance the advantages or disadvantages 

 which would arise if such general adop- 

 tion took place. Let us apply it to the 

 case I have already adduced of the viola- 

 tion of truth. Now it is very obvious 

 that in most cases in which there is any 

 strong tendency to such violation, it ari- 

 ses from the desire to remove or avoid 

 some ill attending our adherence. Hence 

 the temptation to repetition, either by our- 

 selves or others, will always be sufficient- 

 ly powerful, if no counterbalancing consi- 

 derations prevented to induce us to devi- 

 ate from truth, and therefore the proba- 

 bility of our conduct becoming general, 

 is indefinitely great, and consequently in- 

 definiteJy strengthens the reasons we 

 draw against such deviations, from their 

 ill effects if they become general. On 

 the other hand, it is obvious, that if all 

 who could afford it gave to the poor to 

 the extent of their ability, the sources of 

 industry would be dried up, and society 

 would immediately fall into such confu- 

 sion, that if the ideas of punishment were 

 not very enlightened, alms-giving might 

 he deemed a capital crime. Hence we 

 might argue from the general principle 

 already laid down, that we ought not to 

 give at all ; and we think Paley defective 

 in appearance at least for having furnished 

 no clue to a solution of the difficulty. It is 

 immediately solved by the restrictive rule 

 which has been laid down ; what is the 

 probability that alms-giving will become 

 general, or even so general as to produce 

 the feared effects in a small degree ? If 

 this be very small, we have nothing more 

 to do than to consider which is the best 

 direction for our superfluities, and give, 

 with the certainty that our conduct will 

 not become so universal as to render it 

 injurious instead of beneficial. "We now 

 proceed, following Hartley as our outline, 

 to consider those rules of conduct by 

 which we may safely guide ourselves 

 through the intricacies of human life. 



77. The first rule is, that we obey the 

 Scripture precepts in the natural obvious 

 meaning of them. The Scripture pre- 

 cepts are indeed in themselves the rule 

 of life. There is, however, the same 

 kind of difficulty in applying them accu- 

 rately to particular cases, as in applying 

 the above-mentioned most general rule, 

 by means of an estimate of the conse- 

 quences of actions. It is impossible in 

 many particular cases to determine pre- 

 cisely the connection r.f the action with 

 t&e precept. However, unless it would 



