PHILOSOPHY, MORAL, 



obviously lead a person to act in opposi- 

 tion to some or other of the following 

 rules, it is the safest way, in the particu- 

 lar circumstances of real life, to recollect 

 the Scripture precepts, and follow them 

 in their first and most obvious sense. 



78. Secondly, great regard must be had 

 both to the dictates of our own moral 

 sense, and that of others. It is remarked, 

 with great justice, by Dr. Aikin, that, in 

 a mind whose moral powers have been 

 cultivated, second thoughts are seldom 

 the best. The first are the impulse of 

 well-regulated feeling, and are produced 

 instantaneously, without attention to all 

 the petty suggt stio-is of self, which crowd 

 themselves in various ways into our 

 minus, and by leading to doubt, aad then 

 aided by inclination to disobey. pr-jvent 

 the efficacy of the conscience, and throw 

 a m'.st over the befoj-e clear directions of 

 duty. Widi respect to the moral sense 

 of otners, two motives should induce us 

 to regard its dictates. The one is purely 

 benevolent : we ought not to throw any 

 impediment in the way of the duty of 

 others: the other is", that prudence and 

 humility direct, that we use the experi- 

 ence and the feelings produced by great 

 moral culture, as guides of our own con- 

 duct. 



79. Thirdly, it is very proper that, in 

 all deliberate actions, we weigh, as well 

 as we can, the probable consequences on 

 each side, and suffer the balance to have 

 some influence in all cases, and particu- 

 larly where the other rules do not inter- 

 fere, or where they fail of application. 

 But they are generally the dictates of 

 self-interest and pride, to be determined 

 by our own judgments as to conse- 

 quence, in opposition to rules of duty. 



80. Fourthly, The impulse of the more 

 instantaneous emotions of good-will and 

 compassion will not always furnish a suf- 

 ficient guide ; at the same time they 

 ought to have great regard paid to them, 

 lest we contract a philosophic hardness 

 of heart, by pretending to act upon high 

 er and more extensively benevolent views 

 than vulgar minds, or the more feeling 

 sex, Sec. Some, however, carry this much 

 too far on the other side, and encourage 

 many public mischiefs through a false, 

 misguided tenderness to criminals, per- 

 sons in distress through present vice, &c. 

 When feeling is thus made the guide of 

 conduct, he who can best play upon the 

 sympathy, and best decorate his tale of 

 woe, will meet with a reward for his in- 

 genuity, due only to the modest merit 

 which slinks from, the public view, or at 



least obtrudes not itself upon our notice, 

 The injury done to society at large by 

 this ill-directed compassion, so generally 

 prevalent, because it gratifies without 

 trouble, is very great indeed ; and while 

 we have it in our power to cultivate com- 

 passion and sympathy, by the view and 

 the relief of real misery and suffering 

 worth, the desire of such cultivation is 

 scarcely sufficient to exculpate us, when 

 our minds have acquired some degree of 

 comprehension, from the charge of pre- 

 ferring a selfish, indolent gratification to 

 the good of others. To use the words of 

 the elegant Stewart, " the dictates of rea- 

 son and conscience inform us, in lan- 

 guage which it is impossible to mistake, 

 that it is sometimes a duty to check the 

 most amiable and pleasing emotions of 

 the heart; to withdraw, for example, 

 from the sight of those distresses which 

 stronger claims forbid us to relieve, and 

 to deny ourselves that exquisite luxury 

 which arises from the exercise of huma- 

 nity." 



81. Fifthly, the rule of placing our- 

 selves in the several situations of the per- 

 sons concerned, and inquiring what we 

 should then expect, is of excellent use 

 for directing, inforcing, and restraining 

 our actions, and for producing in us a 

 steady, constant sense of what is fit and 

 equitable. This rule is so comprehen- 

 sive, that it may be called the sum and 

 substance of Christian morality. It has 

 been objected by some, that it teaches 

 nothing, for it shows not what justice is ; 

 and that it is an improper rule, for we 

 ought not to do to others what we should 

 wish them to do to us, but what we may 

 justly expect them to do to us. But this is 

 no real objection. The object of the rule 

 most probably is, to serve as a criterion 

 of duty which should counteract the im- 

 pressions of self. We never need fear 

 lest we should carry our imaginary sub- 

 stitution to too great a length, and think 

 of what passion or interest might lead us 

 to expect : when not under the influence 

 of passion or interest, it is more than pro- 

 bable that we shall be guided sufficient- 

 ly accurately. Our only danger is, lest 

 we shouid not go far enough, that v/e 

 should admit of this principle, which, if 

 circumstances had been real, ought to 

 have had no place. This rule of duty, 

 says Dr. Reid, comprehends every rule of 

 justice without exception. It compre- 

 hends all the relative duties, arising ei- 

 ther from the more permanent relations 

 of parent and child, of master and ser- 

 vant, of magistrate and subject, of hus- 

 band and wife, or from the more tran- 



