PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



sient relations of rich and poor, of buyer 

 and seller, of debtor and creditor, of be- 

 nefactor and beneficiary, of friend and 

 enemy. It comprehends every duty of 

 charity and humanity, and even of courte- 

 sy and good manners. He who acts inva- 

 riably by this rule, will never deviate 

 from the principle of his duty but from 

 an error of his judgment. 



82. The word justice (says Mr. Stew- 

 art, in his " Outlines"), in its most exten- 

 sive signification, denotes that disposition 

 which leads us, where our own temper, 

 or passions, or interest, are concerned, 

 to determine and to act, without being 

 biassed by partial considerations. In or- 

 der to free our minds from the influence 

 of these, experience teaches us either to 

 recollect the judgments we have former- 

 ly passed in similar circumstances, on the 

 conduct ot others ; or to state cases to 

 ourselves in which we, and all our per- 

 sonal concerns, are entirely left out of the 

 question. Justice operates, first, in re- 

 straining the partialities of the temper and 

 of the passions; and, secondly, in re- 

 straining the partialities of selfishness, 

 where a competition takes place be- 

 tween our interests and those of other 

 Mien. These two modifications of justice 

 may be distinguished from each other, by 

 calling the first candour, the second inte- 

 grity or honesty. The professor's re- 

 marks on the subject of candour are very 

 valuable and important ; and we deem no 

 apology necessary for laying them before 

 our readers. This disposition, he ob- 

 serves, may be considered in three points 

 of view; as it is displayed in judging of 

 the talents of others ; in judging of their 

 intentions ; and in controversy. 



83. The difficidty of estimating candid- 

 ly the talents of other men arises, in a 

 great measure, from the tendency of 

 emulation to degenerate into envy. Not- 

 withstanding the reality of the theoreti- 

 cal distinction between these dispositions 

 of mind, it is certain that in practice no- 

 thing is more arduous than to realize it 

 completely ; and to check that self-par- 

 tiality, which, while it leads us to dwell 

 on our own personal advantages, and to 

 magnify them in our own estimation, pre- 

 vents us either from attending sufficiently 

 to the merits of others, or from viewing 

 them in the most favourable light. Of 

 all this a good man will soon be satisfied 

 from his own experience ; and he will en- 

 deavour to guard against it as far as he is 

 able, by judging of the pretensions of a 

 rival, or even of an enemy, as he would 

 have done if there had been no interfer- 

 VOL. V. 



ence between his claims and theirs. In 

 other words, he will endeavour to do jus- 

 tice to their merits, and to bring- himself, 

 if possible, to love and to honour that ge- 

 nius and ability which have eclipsed his 

 own. Nor will he retire in disgust from 

 the race, because he has been outstrip- 

 ped by others, but will redouble all his 

 exertions in the service of mankind ; re- 

 collecting, that if nature has been more 

 partial to others than to him in her intel- 

 lectual gifts, she has left open to all the 

 theatre of virtue ; where the merits of in- 

 dividuals are determined, not by their ac- 

 tual attainments, but by the use and im- 

 provement they make of those advanta- 

 ges which their situation has afforded 

 them. 



84. Candour in judging of the inten- 

 tions of others is a disposition of still 

 greater importance. It is highly proba- 

 ble that there is much less vice, or crimi- 

 nal intention, in the world, than is com- 

 monly imagined; and that the greater 

 part of the disputes among mankind arise 

 from mutual mistake, or misapprehen- 

 sion. Every man must recollect many 

 instances in which his motives have been 

 grossly misapprehended by the world; 

 and it is reasonable for him to allow that 

 the case may have been the same with 

 other men. It is but an instance then of 

 that justice we owe to others, to make 

 the most candid allowances for their ap- 

 parent deviation, and to give every ac- 

 tion the most favourable construction it 

 can possibly admit of. Such a temper, 

 while it renders a man respectable and 

 amiable in society, contributes perhaps 

 more than any other circumstance to his 

 private happiness 



85. Candour, in controversy, implies a 

 strong sense of justice, united to a sin- 

 cere and disinterested love of truth. It is 

 a disposition of mind so difficult to pre- 

 serve, and so rarely to be met with, that 

 the most useful rule, perhaps, to be giv- 

 en with respect to it, is to avoid the occa- 

 sions of dispute and opposition. A love 

 of controversy indicates not only an over- 

 weening vanity, and a disregard for truth, 

 but in general, perhaps always, it indi- 

 cates a mediocrity of genius ; for it arises 

 from those feelings of envy and jealousy 

 which provoke little minds to depreciate 

 the merit of useful discoveries. He who 

 is conscious of his own inventive powers, 

 and whose great object is to add to the 

 stock of human knowledge, will reject 

 unwillingly any plausible doctrine till af- 

 ter the most severe examination; and 

 will separate with patience and temper 



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