PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 



the truth it contains from the errors that 

 are blended with them. No opinion can 

 be more groundless, than that a captious 

 and disputatious temper is a mark of 

 acuteness. On the contrary, a sound and 

 manly understanding is, in no instance, 

 more strongly displayed, than in a quick 

 perception of important truth, when im- 

 perfectly stated and blended with error : 

 a perception which may not be sufficient 

 to satisfy the judgment completely at the 

 time, or at least to enable it to obviate the 

 difficulties of others ; but which is suffi- 

 cient to prevent it from a hasty rejection 

 of the whole, from the obvious detects of 

 some of the parts. The effects of con- 

 troversy on the temper, although abun- 

 dantly sensible even in the solitude of 

 the closet, are more peculiarly adverse 

 to the discovery of truth in those dis- 

 putes which occur in conversation ; and 

 which seldom answer any purpose, but 

 to rivet the disputants more firmly in 

 their errors. In consequence, indeed, of 

 such disputes, the intellectual powers 

 may be sharpened, and original hints may 

 be suggested ; but few instances are to 

 be found, in which they do not mislead 

 the disputants to a still greater distance 

 from truth than before, and render their 

 minds still more inaccessible to convic- 

 tion. 



86. Sixthly, persons in the near rela- 

 tions of life, benefactors, dependants, and 

 enemies, seem to have in most cases a 

 prior claim to strangers. General bene- 

 volence arises from the cultivation of the 

 particular sources of it. The root must 

 therefore be cherished before we can ex- 

 pect the branches to flourish, and the 

 fruit to arrive at its perfection. Attention 

 to this rule leads us to avoid all those 

 opinions, which attempt to found univer- 

 sal upon the ruin of confined benevolence : 

 however specious, they may appear they 

 are false, because they counteract the 

 moral improvement of man by checking 

 it at its origin. We particularly refer to 

 those which Godwin has advanced in his 

 work on Political Justice. His most ge- 

 neral principle is, that every individual 

 exertion should be directed so as to pro- 

 duce the greatest possible sum of good 

 to the species. Hence, that if we have 

 the power to save the life or increase the 

 happiness of one or two fellow creatures, 

 we owe our exertions to him who is use- 

 ful, and perhaps extensively useful to so- 

 ciety, in preference to him who is an use- 

 less, or perhaps injurious member of 

 society. The claims of self are excluded 

 by the general principle. " What magic," 



says Godwin, " can there be in the word 

 my, which should change its operation I" 

 Hence the claims of confined charities 

 ought not to oppose the deductions from 

 the general principle. Hence it is not 

 our business, in the direction of our bene- 

 volent exertions, to consider what is the 

 relation in which the individual stands to 

 us ; but that in which he stands to socie- 

 ty. Not, is he my parent, relative, friend, 

 or benefactor ; but, is he a worthy or a 

 worthless member of society. Godwin's 

 errors are the more injurious, because 

 they appear to be the errors of benevo- 

 lence ; they result from the inaccurate 

 extension and application of principles 

 which in themselves are indisputable. 

 Whenever private interest interferes with 

 the public good, private interest is to be 

 sacrificed; and this, whether our own 

 immediate good is the object, or the good 

 of those who are intimately connected 

 with us, by some of the natural bonds ; 

 that is, those which arise in the mind by 

 the laws of our constitution. That the 

 conduct dictated by confined charity is to 

 yield to general good, cannot be disputed ; 

 but that we are in all cases to act totally 

 independently of a regard to those con- 

 fined charities, is a position which will not 

 bear the test of experience nor of the 

 mental constitution of man. In the first 

 place, benevolence never could arise in 

 the human soul, but through their me- 

 dium. Love to others is founded on feel- 

 ings originally personal, then it embraces 

 the narrow circle of our immediate friends 

 and acquaintance, and then perhaps there 

 is little difficulty in extending it to those 

 who bear with us the relation of children 

 to the great parent of mankind. But be- 

 fore we can form the desire to do good 

 to all men, we must have formed the de- 

 sire to do good to some men ; and though 

 the desire of doing good to some, may be 

 of that confined nature which would lead 

 to the promotion of their aggrandisement 

 and happiness, at the expense of those of 

 others, yet the confined charities form 

 too important a part in the great system, 

 to be on this account rejected, as not 

 being on the whole safe guides. We may 

 lop off the excrescences, but it would be 

 folly to destroy the root. But, secondly, 

 admit the formation of the feelings of ge- 

 neral benevolence independently of the 

 private charities, it is obvious, that with- 

 out long culture and enlarged views, the 

 general feelings cannot acquire the vivid- 

 ness, which, by their frequent recurrence 

 and particularity, the more confined feel- 

 ings can. Hence the removal of misery 



