INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 



like those of the human encephalon, evokes in sleep their waking 

 thoughts and desires. The dog of the chace dreams that he pur- 

 sues the hare, and the more peaceful follower of the shepherd, 

 that he collects the straying flock. 



The intelligence of animals is rigorously limited to the objects 

 of the external world that are presented to their senses. The intel- 

 ligence of man has a far wider range. By the senses it is put in 

 relation with the material world ; by consciousness, with the inner 

 being, the soul, and by intuitive ideas and sentiments with God. 



The exalted intelligence of man confers on each individual a 

 character as distinct as his features. He acquires from it his 

 peculiar habits, qualities, tendencies, virtues, and faults. While it 

 makes him free in one sense, it isolates him in another. Instinct, 

 on the contrary, effaces individual distinction, reducing all to a 

 common type. All beavers, and all bees, lead lives absolutely 

 alike, and may be regarded as differing no more than the units 

 which make up an abstract number. 



117. The inferior animals are endowed, as we have seen, 

 largely with the powers of sensation, perception, and memory. 

 They also possess, though in a very inferior degree, powers of 

 comparison, generalisation, judgment, and foresight. In what 

 then, it may be asked, consists the mark of the vast difference in 

 degree of their intelligence, as compared with the mental powers 

 exercised by the human race. This question has been satisfac- 

 torily answered by the observations and researches of Frederick 

 Quvier, Flourens, and others. According to these physiologists, 

 animals receive by their senses impressions similar to those which 

 are received by ours. Like us, also, they preserve and are able 

 to recall the traces of these impressions. And such perceptions 

 being thus preserved, supply for them as for us numerous and 

 varied associations. Like us they combine them, observe their 

 relations, and deduce conclusions from them, and to this extent, 

 but not beyond it, their intelligence goes ; but they have not a 

 glimpse of that class of ideas which Locke denominates ideas of 

 reflection. These, as is well known, are the perceptions which 

 man acquires, not by his organs of sense, but by the power with 

 which he is endowed to render his mind itself, and its operations, 

 the subjects of contemplation and perception. Man has as clear 

 a perception of the faculty of memory, for example, as he has 

 of the colours of the rainbow. The scent of a rose is not more 

 distinct to his apprehension than are his mental powers of com- 

 parison and induction. In short, his ideas of reflection are as 

 vivid and definite as his ideas of sensation, and may, indeed, be 

 said to be even more permanent and inseparable from his intel- 

 lectual existence. He may be deprived of one or more of his 

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