150 THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION 



explicable in any purely mechanical way, they 

 are therefore ' theoretically incapable of 

 solution ' as far as vitalism is concerned. This 

 argument against vitalism is not a success 

 logically, for it assumes, as already proved, 

 what it had undertaken to prove. The 

 speaker next referred to teleology or purposive 

 action (lit. efforts to attain an end ' Ziel- 

 strebigkeit '). 'We may,' he said, 'define 

 expediency by the aid of philosophical subtleties 

 or in any other way, but we cannot avoid the 

 conclusion that expediency and the doctrine 

 of adaptation to purpose (" Zweckmassigkeit") 

 are as much alike as two pins.' 



The underlying reason of this similarity 

 seems to have escaped the critic. It is, of 

 course, that adaptation to purpose is the 

 motive of expediency. 



' Expediency,' continued von Hansemann, ' comes 

 to this : that we conceive all things to be as well 

 as possible adapted to their surroundings.' 



Von Hansemann here betrays the same 

 mistaken idea of absolute expediency on the 

 part of all living creatures, as we corrected in 

 the remarks on Plate's speech (cf. p. 106). 

 Consequently von Hansemann has not succeeded 

 any more than Plate, in proving anything 

 against real expediency, which corresponds 



