THE USE OF HYPOTHESIS. 137 



failed to observe that the inverse use of deduction con- 

 stitutes induction. 



Even Francis Bacon was not wholly unaware of the 

 value of hypothetical anticipation. In one or two places 

 he incidentally acknowledges it, as when he remarks that 

 the subtlety of nature surpasses that of reason, adding 

 that 'axioms abstracted from particular facts in a careful 

 and orderly manner, readily suggest and mark out new 

 particulars/ 



The true course of inductive procedure is that which 

 has yielded all the more lofty and successful results of 

 science. It consists in Anticipating -Nature, in the sense 

 of forming hypotheses as to the laws which are probably 

 in operation ; and then observing whether the combi- 

 nations of phenomena are such as would follow from the 

 laws supposed. The investigator begins with facts and 

 ends with them. He uses such facts as are in the first 

 place known to him in suggesting probable hypotheses ; 

 deducing other facts which would happen if a particular 

 hypothesis is true, he proceeds to test the truth of his 

 notion by fresh observations or experiments. If any 

 result prove different from what he expects, it leads him 

 either to abandon or to modify his hypothesis ; but every 

 new fact may give some new suggestion as to the laws in 

 action. Even if the result in any case agrees with his 

 anticipations, he does not regard it as finally confirmatory 

 of his theory, but proceeds to test the truth of the theory 

 by new deductions and new trials. 



The investigator in such a process is assisted by the 

 whole body of science previously accumulated. He may 

 employ analogy, as I shall point out, to guide him in the 

 choice of hypotheses. The manifold connexions between 

 one science and another may give him strong clues to the 

 kind of laws to be expected, and he thus always selects 

 out of the infinite number of possible hypotheses those 



