Herbert Spencer^ Synthetic Philosophy. 115 



strata of materiality all alike relative to the consciousness 

 of their ' percipients.' " 



The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge and of the 

 inscrutableness of the ultimate nature of things has been 

 held by nearly all the great thinkers of ancient and modern 

 times, including men of firm faith in immortality. To 

 confound this doctrine with the doctrine of materialism is 

 to betray ignorance of philosophic thought. With the 

 question whether there is or is not a future life for man I am 

 not here concerned. Spencer neither affirms belief in such a 

 life nor denies its possibility. There is nothing in his sys- 

 tem of philosophy that involves necessarily, so far as I can 

 see, either the acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of the 

 continuance of conscious existence after bodily dissolution. 

 If it could be disproved, his philosophy would not be af- 

 fected thereby ; if it could be demonstrated beyond doubt 

 to be true, the philosophy would be in no need of modifica- 

 tion, for the phenomenal world would only be extended and 

 the domain of science enlarged. One may hold to Spen- 

 cer's philosophy and yet believe with Shad worth Hodgson 

 in " an ethereal body built up during our lifetime within 

 our grosser body, destined to preserve our individuality after 

 death." The only question is, Is there proof of this theory 

 of an ethereal body? Our American psychologist and phi- 

 losopher, Mr. D. G-. Thompson, who accepts Mr. Spencer's 

 philosophy in all its essential doctrines and implications, is 

 " inclined to the opinion that the ground for the assertion 

 of post-mortem personal self-consciousness in identity with 

 ante-mortem self-consciousness is firmer than for the con- 

 trary belief." He thinks it is " no harder to understand 

 the continued existence of personal existence after death 

 than to comprehend its occultation in sleep and restoration 

 afterward." Mr. Thompson adds : " The same arguments 

 tliat support the belief in continued personal existence after 

 death tend also to prove an existence before birth. Is it 

 possible that we must return to the pre-existence doctrines 

 of the ancient philosophers'? Is it possible that we must 

 each say, I am ; therefore I always Avas and always shall be ? 

 Dios sabe ! '''' Others think that the implications of Spen- 

 cer's philosophy point to physical dissolution as the end of 

 consciousness. 



A few years ago Mr. Richard A. Proctor, in conversation, 

 gave me his estimate of Herbert Spencer, which subsequent- 

 ly, by my request, be put in a form for publication, and it 



