Herbert Spencer^s Synthetic Philosophy. 119 



as that upon which he has reared his doctrine of evolution. I refer to 

 his theory of an unknowable power, or ultimate force or final first 

 cause, from which all things proceed. 



This conclusion can not be drawn from such unassailable premises 

 as Mr. Spencer's definition of space — viz., the abstract of all coexist- 

 ences ; nor from the character of such existences to be found in his 

 definition of matter — viz., coexistent positions which offer resistance — 

 implying, as he must imply, all of motion in that word " positions," 

 and excluding, as he must exclude therefrom, all ideas of fixity. Fi- 

 nality can not be ascribed to cause ; and with the fall of finality comes 

 the fall of its illogical conclusion — viz., that creative power which is 

 implied in Mr. Spencer's words, '" from which all things proceed." 



All we know or can imagine of cause is antecedence — that one thing 

 precedes another and a different thing in time. 



There is no question of a series here. The last thing is not the end 

 of cause, and the first thing does not begin it. The one is as unthink- 

 able as the other. With the demolition of finality, what becomes of 

 its creative power f There is no question here of quantity nor of qual- 

 ity. If matter is indestructible, power could not have caused it; and, 

 if power is imperishable, it can not in that respect be distinguished 

 from matter. If power has any existence, it falls under the definition 

 of matter ; if space is all existence, it can have no other meaning than 

 indefinitely extended matter, and their coexistence prevents proces- 

 sion and throws out all ideas of final cause and final antecedence. 



It seems to me that Mr. Spencer's error flows from a misapplication 

 of the fact that we think in relations and can not think of a knowable 

 power except as related to an unknowable power. 



This relation has nothing to do with the subject, for the reason that 

 it is not a question of the relation of a knowable whole or a knowable 

 part to an unknowable whole, for space is not a limited whole, and an 

 unlimited whole is a contradiction in terms. Space has no opposite, 

 no antithesis. Form is not its opposite. The constantly changing 

 forms which indefinitely extended matter assumes are included in 

 apace, as the shape of the apple is included in the apple. 



Of course there is no time to-night to amplify the views which I 

 have expressed, nor to state them except dogmatically, and I will 

 therefore close by thanking the lecturer for his paper and the audi- 

 ence for its attention. 



Dr. Robert G. Eccles : 



Mr. Underwood's lecture is a very able and satisfactory exposition 

 of the sjTithetic philosophy. He had a big subject to deal with, and, 

 of course, could only be expected to present the merest outline in an 



