12 The Scope and Pr'mc'qiles 



and coexistences we cannot penetrate. The very concep- 

 tion of relativity, however, carries with it the knowledge 

 of the Absolute as existing, and as involved in all phenom- 

 enal processes. As we cannot have a shadow without 

 litrht, so we cannot have the relative without the Absolute : 

 the existence of the one is proof positive of the existence 

 of the other. And since the relations which we know are 

 constant, since the law of cause and effect is universally 

 operative throughout the world of phenomena, our knowl- 

 edge, though relational, is real — as real to us as Avould be 

 our knowledge of the thing in itself, were such knowledge 

 attainable. In knowing phenomena we do know the nou- 

 menon as it is related to us. 



The materialistic critic of the evolution-philosophy 

 comes to us, indeed, Avith the assumption that the universe 

 is just Avhat we see it to be, and nothing else. As it is in 

 sense-jierception, so it is in its essential nature. Mind 

 itself is material. " The brain secretes thought as the 

 liver secretes bile" — thought itself is a material product. 

 We must assume something, he says: why not assume that 

 the testimony of our senses is final and conclusive ? It is 

 evident, however, that this position of the materialist is 

 reached not by a [)rocess of thought, but by the negation 

 of though^, lie is either incapable of duly considering 

 the prcjbh'ms involved in this discussion, or else he delib- 

 erately refuses to consider them, denouncing them as futile 

 and unproiitabh' speculations. The evolutionist, however, 

 assumes nothing, except the actual facts of exi)erience ; his 

 ultimate criterion of truth is the inability to conceive the 

 oj)posite of the proposition under discussion. The "fun- 

 damental assumption" of the materialist is neither logical 

 nor .scieiitiHc — it is essentially a metajihysical assumption, 

 and illustrates a very crude and primitive sent of meta- 

 pliysics at that. Tlie evolutionist indulges in no assump- 

 tions, falls ])ack on no "first ])rin('iples," or "axiomatic 

 trutijs," the origin and history of which he cannot trace 

 in the experience; of the race. Every conscious ex})erience 

 constitutes a imit of knowledge, and science is simply the 

 orderly cliussilication and interpretation of such experi- 

 ences, Tp science, therciore, the evolutionist appeals — 

 not to UM'taphysies — and by science is the i)osition of the 

 mati'riali.st un(h'rmine<l and overthrown. 



(Jonsich-r. for example, what science teaches us of the 



