The Philosophy of Evolution. 365 



ology and physics, one needs to be a physician in order to compre- 

 hend them. Matter in its outer aspects is knowable, in its ultimate 

 aspects is unknowable. Matter and force are not what they appear 

 to be to the senses. A feather is brushed across our hand. We 

 say, " The feather tickles." But this is not true. The tickle is in 

 us, not in the feather. Color is not in the objects we see around 

 us, it is the elfect produced upon our brain by an inconceivably 

 rapid vibration of the rays of light proceeding from the object. 

 Sound does not exist apart from the hearer; if there were no hearer 

 there would be no sound. "We can acquire knowledge of how the 

 universe affects us, but not of the universe itself. We know that 

 there is more than matter and motion in the universe. There is 

 Mind and Being, which cannot be explained in terms of matter or 

 motion. As to the identity of evolution in other worlds with that 

 in our world, assumed by Mr. Xichols, the theory of evolution, 

 which shows that all things tend continually to differentiation, 

 requires that there should be diversity instead of identity in the 

 development of life on other planets. 



Mr. Dudley Blanchakd: — 



The evolution of mechanics is one of the most important phases 

 of the whole subject under discussion, and I am glad to see it at 

 last touched upon, by the present lecturer. I rise merely, as one 

 interested in mechanical pursuits, to thank him for what he has 

 said upon this topic. 



Dk. Lewis G. Jajs^es: — 



As to the beneficent character of the material progi'ess of which 

 Mr. Xichols has spoken, I am wholly in agi'eement with him. 

 That this, however, is all there is of the Philosophy of Evolution, 

 I cannot agree. In all this discussion, we are questioning about 

 what we can know. Jfow, fundamental to all such considerations, 

 is the question: What is an act of knov:in(j ? What is conscious- 

 ness ? If wholly a subjective process, unrelated to material con- 

 ditions, then it is difficult to escape from the conclusions of the 

 Idealist. If wholly a product of material conditions, then we must 

 follow Mr. Nichols. But if, as I believe, it is subjecto-objective, 

 testifying at once to a thought-process which cannot be expressed 

 in material terms, and to the reality of an external material world, 

 then we must either rest in this Dualism as an ultimate and unex- 

 plainable fact, or go forward to a monism based upon the doctrine 

 of the Unknowable. Mr. Nichols says we see thought in other 

 men only as brain-motion. Now, I never have been so fortunate 



