POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR MONOPOLISTIC CONDITIONS 25 



apparent simplicity even, which presents a strong appeal to 

 certain minds. It is perfectly conceivable too that if the Gov- 

 ernment is to engage in the regulation of prices at all, lumber 

 prices might seem as good a point of attack as any. The in- 

 dustry is based on a natural monopoly, is fairly well central- 

 ized, the product simple and generally well standardized. Fur- 

 thermore the cost of production, as far as that might enter into 

 the fixing of price, could be as easily determined for lumber 

 as for almost any product. 



It will be profitable, however, to point out certain objections 

 to this scheme, to indicate briefly some of the difficulties in- 

 volved. Immediately questions arise as to the personnel and 

 manner of appointing such a commission, and the scope of its 

 powers. To be effective, it must, of course, have broad powers, 

 and this would make its personnel a matter of the greatest im- 

 portance. Clearly if the lumber interests were to have a 

 strong representation on the commission its work might amount 

 to little or nothing. It is scarcely to be doubted that any rep- 

 resentatives of other lines of business on this commission would 

 line up with the lumber representatives in most events, because 

 once the Government embarked on a policy of price regulation, 

 most lines of big business would cooperate in common self-de- 

 fense. Experience with minimum wage commissions points 

 to the possibility of difficulties of this nature. 



It would perhaps be fairly easy to conceive of an ideal com- 

 mission, with a majority of highly trained men who could han- 

 dle the business with intelligence, but it is easier to conceive 

 of a commission created accordng to canons of political expe- 

 diency, the fruit of political debates and trades and compro- 

 mises rather than of intelligent and judicious planning. Ex- 

 perience with the Interstate Commerce Commission indicates 

 that it would take many years of experimenting to develop any 

 degree of efficiency in the regulation of prices. 



The price regulating commission would presumably be a Fed- 

 eral institution, and the definition of its powers and jurisdiction 

 would present certain difficulties. It could get jurisdiction 

 only under the interstate commerce clause of the constitution, 

 and so would be unable to reach lumber which did not enter 

 into interstate commerce, unless effective cooperation were se- 



