37 DARWINISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE 



names, just as we take certain metals of which there 

 are only pieces that differ in size, shape, contour, 

 and colour, under the name "iron." 



How is this comprehension of individually different 

 bodies possible ? By regarding only that which objects 

 have in common and overlooking the individual features. 

 When, for instance, we give the name "gold" to a 

 large number of objects, we look merely to the common 

 brilliance, the colour, and the weight, and do not take 

 account of the difference of the pieces of gold in size, 

 angles, surfaces, etc. 



Science continues the work of language, as it were. 

 It brings together a number of bodies by regarding 

 merely what they have in common. In this way it 

 creates scientific concepts. A certain number of the 

 countless particular things in the world, which have 

 certain common features, are "conceived." But science 

 has something further to do. It must give definite 

 formulae to its concepts, so that we may know what 

 is the common element in the particulars that the 

 concept embodies. That is done by a number of 

 propositions or judgments. The scientific conception 

 must always be capable of conversion into judgments. 

 Judgments of this kind on the concept "diamond," for 

 instance, would run : transparency, refraction, hardness, 

 definite angles of the surfaces, etc. 



A good deal is accomplished by these concepts. 

 Large numbers of diverse things have been made 

 comprehensible. But the number of these concepts, 

 in turn, is immense, and science would have done 



