NATURE HISTORY, AND ETHICS 391 



intelligible to the human mind. But it follows from our 

 theses that reality is infinitely varied on the one hand, 

 and that scientific theory stands higher in proportion to 

 its simplicity on the other, or that scientific theory is the 

 more perfect the less reality it reflects in its concepts. 



This statement in no way diminishes the importance 

 and objectivity of science. Although the scientific 

 concepts are not pictures of reality they are very closely 

 related to it. There cannot be any unscientific 

 arbitrariness in science because its concepts are 

 universally valid. They are unconditionally true, not 

 because they depict reality but because they apply to it. 



How is it, then, that it is not obvious to everyone 

 that ideas do not correspond to individuals ? How is it 

 that so many people think there is some reality 

 corresponding to the idea " wolf," whereas the idea has 

 only been found by the mind transforming the reality in 

 order to grasp it ? 



It is because, in the first place, man's senses have 

 only a limited power of discrimination. Widely 

 differing objects often seem to us to be alike ; even on 

 closer examination we often see only their common 

 features, and do not see their individuality until we look 

 carefully for it. Many bodies, such as grains of sand, 

 seem alike to us however closely we examine them ; it 

 takes a lens or a microscope to show that not one of 

 them is absolutely similar to another. But that our 

 senses perceive common features first and foremost, and 

 that our intelligence always recognises first the common 

 features of the objects about us, is clearly a faculty that 



