62 THE GREEK SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY. 



things: for it was impossible, he conceived, that 

 there should be a general common definition of any 

 sensible object, since such were always in a state of 

 change. The things, then, which were the subjects 

 of universal truths he called Ideas ; and held that 

 objects of sense had their names according to Ideas 

 and after them ; so that things participated in that 

 Idea which had the same name as was applied to 

 them." 



In agreement with this, we find the opinions 

 suggested in the Parmenides of Plato, the dialogue 

 which is considered by many to contain the most 

 decided exposition of the doctrine of Ideas. In this 

 dialogue, Parmenides is made to say to Socrates, 

 then a young man 25 , "0 Socrates, philosophy has 

 not yet claimed you for her own, as, in my judg- 

 ment, she will claim you, and you will not dishonour 

 her. As yet, like a young man as you are, you look 

 to the opinions of men. But tell me this : it ap- 

 pears to you, as you say, that there are certain 

 Kinds or Ideas (ei)) of which things partake and 

 receive applications according to that of which they 

 partake : thus those things which partake of Like- 

 ness are called like ; those things which partake of 

 Greatness are called great ; those things which par- 

 take of Beauty and Justice are called beautiful and 

 just" To this Socrates assents. And in another part 

 of the dialogue he shows that these Ideas are not 

 included in our common knowledge, from whence 

 " Parmenid. p. 131. 



