PSYCHOLOGY 257 



tions of every animal and ever}- man, a theory which he was 

 led to adopt by confusing the products of the mind's activity 

 (protein-disintegration) with the mind itself. 



By far the most dangerous rock upon which psychologists 

 have been, and are still being, wrecked is the artificial invention 

 of dualism between mind and life, the former being considered 

 a purely immaterial force independent of the body, and only 

 during life incorporate with the body, which at the death of 

 the body does not parish but is immortal. 



On the other hand, Huschke, at the conclusion of his work 

 on the skull and brain, said boldly that he had nothing in 

 common with the view of those who represent the mind as some- 

 thing floating over our organism too lofty to be connected in 

 any way with the material basis of our existence. It would be 

 as unreasonable to speak of the abode of the mind as it is im- 

 possible to understand by the mind anything else than the higher 

 unity of body and spirit. In this broad sense the mind pervades 

 our whole body and may be omnipresent in its every molecule. 

 Even if one inquires for the seat of the spiritual life and means 

 thereby the mind, still this spiritual life may pervade our 

 whole organism as a partial manifestation of the spiritual breath 

 immanent in all nature. In a pantheistic sense he calls each 

 individual mind a portion of the mind of the universe. According 

 to this theory, the seat of the mind should only be spoken of if 

 by mind is understood not merely the feeling of the personality, 

 the consciousness of self, but also the whole higher spiritual life. 

 For this we may look to the mass of nerves and especially to the 

 brain. The nerve-mass may be the body or life of our real ego ^ 

 the brain its centre. In a pantheistic sense the mind goes through 

 the whole corporeal world and all our organs, so there is " no 

 thought without a body. All matter is living, and all mind- 

 activity has an inherent accompaniment of matter." 



Wundt in iS/4 1 propounded a similar idea although modi- 

 fied in a monistic direction. He raised the objection to dualism 

 that having exhausted every possible experiment to explain it 

 he found none satisfactory. This he regarded as proof of its 

 being really untenable, and he became aware of the necessity 

 for formulating a monistic theory. Wundt calls the mind the 



1 Gntndzuge der physiol.-psychologie, Leipzig, 1874. 

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