270 THE HUMAN SPECIES 



Consciousness, Self -consciousness. It is clear from the fore- 

 going that man enjoys no monopoly of consciousness as the 

 advocates of the anthropocentric theory aver, but that the first 

 evidences of consciousness appear in the higher grades of 

 animal life. On the whole, however, those physiologists and 

 psychologists go too far who hold all psychic functions to be 

 conscious. If one starts out with the notion of consciousness 

 as an " internal mirroring," one sees that the theory of conscious- 

 ness as a property of every organism, every cell and every atom 

 is not compatible with this notion, for from the physiological 

 standpoint alone it is more reasonable to assume that conscious- 

 ness only exists where there are definite organs, special nerve- 

 centres for bringing about this " internal mirroring ". 



Among zoologists and physiologists there is no unanimity 

 as to where the lowest degree of consciousness is to be found, 

 but no thinking scientist denies the consciousness of the higher 

 mammals, man's nearest allies (apes, dogs, elephants) ; and 

 there is no difference of opinion that the highest phase of 

 " internal mirroring," self-consciousness, is found only in man. 



Deliberation, Judgment, Reason. That animals act with 

 deliberation Tiirkheim : in accordance with the point of view 

 so frequently quoted has denied. It is only given to man to 

 deliberate ; in animals there is no question of systematic design, 

 all their actions are the outcome of a simple automatism. Yet 

 even in Invertebrates, and still more in the higher orders of 

 Vertebrates, designed actions can be observed. Ants finding 

 they cannot drag their load alone, bring back other ants to the 

 twig they had left behind so that their united efforts may 

 move it. 



Birds and beasts of prey summon one another to the spoil. 

 Elephants carry heavy loads together without waiting for any 

 orders. An ape that cannot reach an object because he is 

 chained up, advances to the full extent of his tether, turns round 

 so that he can stretch out farther and grasps the object with 

 his feet. 



These examples of deliberate actions bespeak a faculty 

 which the more highly organised animals share with man, 

 namely, concentration upon a limited field of associated ideas. 



1 Tiirkheim, he. cit., p. no. 



