PSYCHOLOGY 291 



lapse of consciousness. Even Wundt l recognises in man and 

 animals certain purposive reflexes which have acquired this 

 character as the result of voluntary acts transmitted through 

 many preceding generations until they have become a constant 

 attribute. But of primary reflexes Wundt will hear nothing, 

 and opposes most determinedly the views of those who suggest 

 that reflex actions may be the source from which the will has 

 developed ; he does not in fact hesitate to say that the protozoa 

 are not merely reflex machines but give plain evidence of volun- 

 tary movement. 2 In this respect he is in favour of the funda- 

 mental similarity between the human and the animal mind, and 

 directly contradicts the Cartesian and "orthodox" view of the 

 absolute automatism of animals and the free will of man. The 

 truth probably lies somewhere midway between these two views, 

 and at any rate warrants the assumption of a gradual progressive 

 evolution of the will. 



We have previously learnt to regard " impulses " as actions 

 which represent the endeavour to give effect to the feelings. 

 The simpler impulses have little more than the character of 

 reflexes. The inborn, or connate impulses, the "instincts." 

 are originally blind actions without definite ideas, being purely 

 reflex movements, as, for instance, the hungry infant feeling for 

 the mother's breast, or a kitten whose eyes are just open clawing 

 at anything that moves. Wundt distinguishes sharply between 

 impulses and instincts, the former word is used to denote the 

 simpler purposive movements, the latter to denote the more 

 complex impulsive actions which presuppose a long course of 

 individual or generic practice. Instinctive action, therefore, 

 stands midway between reflex movement and pure voluntary 

 action. 3 The definition of " instinct " has been constantly more 

 sharply limited since Kant's day. Kant regarded "instinct "as 

 a feeling of the necessity to do something, or to enjoy something 

 of which one has as yet formed no concept ; Herbert Spencer 

 defined it as the complex reflex movement dependent on the 

 physical complexity of the organism ; Hartmann as a purposive 

 action without consciousness of the purpose. Darwin and his 

 school see in the instincts purposive actions which are not the 

 outcome of deliberation but rather of indistinct ideas of the 



1 Wundt, loc. cit., p. 398 et seq. z lbid., p. 226. *Ibid., p. 388. 



I 9 * 



