88 American Economic Association [886 



unwise l and unscrupulous 2 and that even in cases of 

 employment for long periods, employers will, not in- 

 frequently, discount the future at too high a rate and 

 overwork their employees. The temptation to do this 

 way is especially strong when free laborers are employed 

 because the services of a freeman are not ordinarily 

 paid for in advance and for the whole period of possible 

 employment, as in the purchase of a slave, but day by 

 day, or month by month, and the death or total disabiliy 

 of the freeman relieves the employer from paying for 

 the latter portion of the stipulated term, that is for that 

 portion of the term when the overworked laborer is 

 least efficient. Moreover, except as provided for by the 

 employer's liability acts, the employer of free labor has 

 no financial interest in the welfare of a workman after 

 the stipulated period of service is in any way terminated. 



141 1 challenge the assumption which underlies the orthodox doc- 

 trine of wages, namely, the sufficiency of the sense of self interest. 

 Mankind, always less wise, and too often foolish to the point of stu- 

 pidity, on the one side, and of fanaticism, on the other, whether in 

 government, in domestic life, in the care of their bodies, or in the 

 care of their souls, do not suddenly become wise in industrial con- 

 cerns. The argument for keeping a laborer well applies with equal 

 force to the maintenance of a slave." Francis A. Walker: Wages, 

 p. 58. 



" It shocks us to-day to hear the allegation that slaveowners once 

 discussed in convention the expediency of using a slave up in six 

 years or four years in a certain occupation, and decided that it ' paid ' 

 to use him up in four." Ely : Outlines of Economics, p. 182. 



3 "Certainly, it seldom happens that any one in the position of a 

 monopolist with respect to the purchase of labor power will look 

 ahead for years and ask, Is not the course I am pursuing likely to 

 diminish the labor supply ? We do not find any action on the part of 

 the purchaser of labor power which would indicate that this is the 

 case. Take the example of the sweater and his victims. We do not 

 find that he is held back from exercising his full power over them by 

 the fear that he will cut off the future supply of labor power. He 

 thinks that it will be forthcoming from some source ; but even if not, 

 he thinks, before the supply dries up I will reap my harvest ; I will 

 make my fortune." Ely : Monopolies and Trusts, p. 132. 



