THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY. 225 



Does probability exist in the things which are probable, 

 or in the mind which regards them as such 1 The 

 etymology of the name lends us no assistance : for, 

 curiously enough, probable is ultimately the same word 

 as provable, a good instance of one word becoming differ- 

 entiated to two opposite meanings. 



Chance cannot be the subject of the theory, because 

 there is really no such thing as chance, a regarded as pro- 

 ducing and governing events. This name signifies falling, 

 and the notion is continually used as a simile to express 

 uncertainty, because we can seldom predict how a die, 

 or a coin, or a leaf will fall, or when a bullet will hit 

 the mark. But every one knows, on a little reflection, that 

 it is in our knowledge the deficiency lies, not in the cer- 

 tainty of nature's laws. There is no doubt in lightning 

 as to the point it shall strike ; in the greatest storm there 

 is nothing capricious ; not a grain of sand lies upon the 

 beach, but infinite knowledge would account for its lying 

 there ; and the course of every falling leaf is guided by 

 the same principles of mechanics as rule the motions of 

 the heavenly bodies. 



Chance then exists not in nature, and cannot co-exist 

 with knowledge ; it is merely an expression for our 

 ignorance of the causes in action, and our consiquent 

 inability to predict t:.e result, or to bring it about in- 

 fallibly. In nature the happening of a physical event 

 has been pre-determined from the first fashioning of the 

 universe. Probability belongs wholly to the mind ; this 

 indeed is proved by the fact that different minds may 

 regard the very same event at the same time with totally 

 different degrees of probability. A steam-vessel, for in- 

 stance, is missing and some persons believe that she has 

 sunk in mid-ocean ; others think differently. In the 



a Diifau, ' De la Methode d'Observation,' chap. iii. 

 Q 



