PROGRESSIVENESS OF SCIENCE. 57 



suggested, then, in short, it did.' That is the sum 

 of our argument. . . . Surely, then, to collect and 

 codif y the facts of Variation is the first duty of the 

 naturalist. This work should be undertaken if only 

 to rid our science of that excessive burden of contra- 

 dictory assumptions by which it is now oppressed. 

 ... If we had before us the facts of Variation 

 there would be a body of evidence to which in these 

 matters of doubt we could appeal. We should no 

 longer say ' if Variation take place in such a way/ or 

 ' if such a variation were possible ' ; we should on the 

 contrary be able to say, ' since Variation does, or at 

 least may take place in such a way,' ( since such and 

 such a Variation is possible,' and we should be ex- 

 pected to quote a case or cases of such occurrence as 

 an observed fact." 



It was in this mood that Bateson compiled his 

 invaluable work, which, though still represented by 

 only Part I., has been a big stride towards a more 

 scientific basis for the study of organic evolution. It 

 has been followed by numerous statistical studies of 

 actually occurring variations, by experimental at- 

 tempts to distinguish between germinal variations 

 and bodily acquired modifications (due to the in- 

 fluence of functions and environment), and so on. 

 The point is, that here, as in many other cases, an 

 over-impetuous, undoubtedly too easy-going science, 

 has had to retrace its steps, and to begin again where 

 science always begins, in precise and unprejudiced 

 observation and recording of facts, in measurement, 

 and in experiment. 



(6) A Fuller Recognition of fhe Unities. When 

 we recall the fact that qualitative advance is very 

 slow, while quantitative advance is exceedingly rapid, 

 we are led to enquire whether there may not be some 



