ANIMAL AUTOMATISM. 243 



the brain are the causes of all the states of conscious- 

 ness of brutes. Is there any evidence that these states 

 of consciousness may, conversely, cause those molecular 

 changes which give rise to muscular motion ? I see no 

 such evidence. The frog walks, hops, swims, and goes 

 through his gymnastic performances quite as well with- 

 out consciousness, and consequently without volition, as 

 with it ; and, if a frog, in his natural state, possesses any- 

 thing corresponding with what we call volition, there is 

 no reason to think that it is anything but a concomi- 

 tant of the molecular changes in the brain which form 

 part of the series involved in the production of mo- 

 tion. 



The consciousness of brutes would appear to be re- 

 lated to the mechanism of their body simply as a col- 

 lateral product of its working, and to be as completely 

 without any power of modifying that working as- the 

 steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomo- 

 tive engine is without influence upon its machinery. 

 Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indica- 

 tive of physical changes, not a cause of such changes. 



This conception of the relations of states of con- 

 sciousness with molecular changes in the brain of psy- 

 choses with neuroses does not prevent us from ascrib- 

 ing free will to brutes. For an agent is free when 

 there is nothing to prevent him from doing that which 

 he desires to do. If a greyhound chases a hare, he is 

 a free agent, because his action is in entire accordance 

 with his strong desire to catch the hare ; while so long 



