268 SENSATION" AND THE SENSIFEROUS ORGANS. 



with the sensorium, matter and motion come to an end ; 

 while phenomena of another order, or immaterial states 

 of consciousness, make their appearance. How is the 

 relation between the material and the immaterial phe- 

 nomena to be conceived ? This is the metaphysical prob- 

 lem of problems, and the solutions which have been 

 suggested have been made the corner-stones of systems 

 of philosophy. Three mutually irreconcilable readings 

 of the riddle have been offered. 



The first is, that an immaterial substance of mind 

 exists ; and that it is affected by the mode of motion 

 of the sensorium in such a way as to give rise to the 

 sensation. 



The second is, that the sensation is a direct effect of 

 the mode of motion of the sensorium, brought about 

 without the intervention of any substance of mind. 



The third is, that the sensation is neither directly 

 nor indirectly an effect of the mode of motion of the 

 sensorium, but that it has an independent cause. Prop- 

 erly speaking, therefore, it is not an effect of the motion 

 of the sensorium, but a concomitant of it. 



As none of these hypotheses is capable of even an 

 approximation to demonstration, it is almost needless to 

 remark that they have been severally held with tenacity 

 and advocated with passion. I do not think it can be 



judgments based on the sensations. The term " self" is applied not only 

 to the series of mental phenomena which constitute the ego, but to the 

 fragment of the physical world which is their constant concomitant. The 

 corporeal self, therefore, is part of the non-ego ; and is objective in rela- 

 tion to the ego as subject. 



