190 MORAL MEEIT 



Hospitality may have a very definite purpose in view, as 

 in the case of a dog -which, having been seriously assaulted 

 by a larger one, and being desirous of revenging itself on 

 its adversary, gave a dinner from its own saved-up rations 

 to a number of guests, in return for which they gave their 

 services, which consisted in the worrying of the obnoxious 

 bully (Macaulay). The sagacious sufferer here offered a 

 bribe or reward beforehand for certain required services; 

 there was prepayment of service, appreciation of reward, 

 knowledge of the efficacy of a bribe, selection of the 

 proper kind of bribe, self-denial in saving half its rations 

 for 'a length of time, providence in storing this half for a 

 future definite use, formation of a plan of action, and com- 

 munication to others of its wishes and ideas. It cannot be 

 affirmed that man's hospitality is always or generally deter- 

 mined by such satisfactory reasons, or that it developes or is 

 the outcome of as high traits of moral or mental character. 



The interest which social animals take in each others' 

 affairs or operations, ordinary or extraordinary, or which 

 the dog, monkey, or other animals take in the doings of 

 man, may be mere curiosity ; and we know that curiosity 

 exercises a frequent and powerful influence among the lower 

 animals, as in man. But it is obviously not mere curiosity 

 that induces the mother fox to sit quietly, complacently, and 

 gravely contemplating the sports of her young (Houzeau) ; 

 nor can curiosity have any influence in leading the dog, 

 horse, elephant, or other working animals to take a profes- 

 sional interest in their work. 



When a dog voluntarily shares its master's prison it may 

 be actuated not by sympathy, but by mere love of his society, 

 attachment to his person, and dislike to be separated ; and 

 a mere love of companionship may also be suggested as the 

 motive that leads free birds voluntarily to imprison them- 

 selves with those which are caged. 



It has been contended that what other animals do is the 

 expedient, not the right ; and that this is sometimes the case 

 there is no reason to doubt. They deliberate, as man does, 

 whether a contemplated act will be profitable or safe, they 

 balance probable ultimate pains against certain immediate 

 pleasures, and they act according to the degree of their self- 



