AND DEMERIT. 191 



control, on the one hand, and of their temptation on the 

 other, too frequently seeking present gratification and disre- 

 garding ulterior punishment. But that they do not always 

 select the expedient, and that they can do the right in the 

 face of apparent inexpediency, is shown by countless in- 

 stances of devotion to the death. Or we are told that right 

 and wrong action may be, and perhaps generally is, deter- 

 mined by fear of punishment or expectation of reward. 

 Unquestionably it frequently is so, but not more frequently 

 so than in man in all probability not so frequently. 



By those who deny human virtues to the lower animals we 

 are told that duty in the dog, or what is called duty, is only a 

 shadow thereof and the offspring of fear. No doubt in some, 

 or it may be in many, cases this holds good. But the more 

 closely the subject is studied in man, the more will the un- 

 biassed student be compelled to admit that in him too duty 

 is frequently the result to some degree or in some form of 

 fear fear of suffering from the consequences of neglecting 

 it. There is no good reason to doubt, however, that, equally 

 in the dog and in man, the dominant or sole motive in duty 

 or sacrifice is, sometimes at least, disinterested affection. 



If it be urged that a dog may know that an action is for- 

 bidden by its master without necessarily knowing that it is in 

 itself in any true sense wrong or immoral, the answer is that 

 to discuss such a point would involve a quibble of words, and 

 that there can be no doubt that the only idea possessed by 

 many savages, by children, by many idiots and lunatics, by 

 criminals and others of the uneducated classes of every civi- 

 lised community, of wrongfulness of action or wrong-doing is 

 that it is prohibited, forbidden, in some way by fellow-man. 

 Both other animals and men know that certain actions are 

 wrong, in the sense at least that they deserve and will bring 

 punishment. 



Han's errors of interpretation of animal motive are such 

 that moral merit may really be greatest where it appears, in 

 his estimation, to be least. For instance, the dislike in a 

 really brave and magnanimous dog to fight with another 

 that is not in any sense its ' match ' may lead to apparent 

 cowardice, when there is really a display of wonderful for- 

 bearance. 



