254 SCIENCE AND THE HUMAN MIND 



be forgotten that, even if the whole of life regarded 

 externally as a subject of scientific study be reduced 

 to physical or mechanical terms, the internal pheno- 

 mena of consciousness, when the mind looks inward 

 on itself, remain a world apart. 



The extreme Darwinian position a position 

 Darwin himself never claimed has been criticised 

 by Wigand, Nageli, Wolff and others. Natural 

 selection is allowed by all to be a v era causa in deter- 

 mining the limits of species. But it is now pointed 

 out that it can only eliminate what cannot survive, 

 never create diversities. To explain by natural 

 selection the existence of some organic character is, 

 says Nageli, as though one explained the presence of 

 certain leaves on a tree by saying that the gardener 

 had not cut them away. That statement may explain 

 why other possible leaves are not there, and why only 

 the actual leaves to be seen have survived, but behind 

 it is the marvel of why gardener or no gardener- 

 there are leaves at all. 



Natural selection, it is said, fails to account for 

 mutual adaptations, such as those existing between 

 plants and insects. It fails too to explain organs 

 which are composed of many parts, such as the eye, 

 and still act as functional units. It fails once more to 

 account for the first origin of organs, which only 

 become of survival value at a later stage of develop- 

 ment. Through all life appears an inherent purpose- 

 fulness, as an essential and fundamental property of 

 the organism. This evidence of purpose, of direction, 

 of intention, underlies the whole of biological develop- 

 ment, and may give the clue to a revaluation and 

 extension of the facts now available for discussion. 



